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EQUAL SPEECH PROTECTION
FrancescaL. Procaccini*
Politicalspeech is not special. No type of speech is. FirstAmendment
doctrine ubiquitously claims to value speech on a hierarchy, with
political speech occupying the highest and most-protected position,
followed by commercial speech and speech on private matters, with
low-value speech on the bottom, least-protectedrung. This hierarchy is
a myth. The true but hiddenframework offree speech law is actually
one of equal speech protection. All speech, includingpoliticalspeech,
receives comparableprotection-andthat level of protection is quite
moderate across the board. Specifically, the equal protection speech
receives permits the state to regulate speech in order to protect a safe
and informed democratic discourse. This Article explains the origins
and bases of the hierarchy myth, the reasons why equal speech
protection supplants the hierarchymodel, and the consequences of the
myth's persistence despite its failure to guidefree speech doctrine.
Dismantlingthe myth that the FirstAmendment embraces a hierarchy
of speech protection is critical at this precarious moment in the
development offree speech law, when regulatingspeech-ofall kindsis essential tofostering a healthy public sphere. By excavating a robust
traditionof equal and moderate speech protection out from under the
shadow of the hierarchymyth, this Article recovers the hidden "social
democratic theory" of speech protection-a theory that is singularly
suited to addressingthe modern speech challenges raisedby an everexpanding digital economy and dangerously toxic political speech
environment.

* Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. I'm grateful to Jack Balkin,
Ash Bhagwat, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Evelyn Douek, Richard Fallon, Noah Feldman,
Michael Klarman, Martha Minow, Alex Tsesis, Laura Weinrib, and participants of the
Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference and the Information Society Project Workshop
at Yale Law School for valuable comments and insights, to Francisco Collantes for excellent
research, and to the editors of the Virginia Law Review for superb editing.
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INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment's hierarchy of protection for different types of
speech is a myth. The doctrine has long purported to place political speech

at the highest and most protected position in this hierarchy, followed by
commercial speech and speech on purely private matters, with "low-
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value" speech like obscenity and fighting words on its bottom rung.' This
basic hierarchy, however, is a doctrinal fiction. As a theory, it does not
accurately describe how the First Amendment protects speech; as a
doctrine, it does not guide the Supreme Court's application of free speech

law. The true but hidden framework of modern free speech law is one of
equal speech protection. Through a holistic reevaluation of the Supreme
Court's free speech jurisprudence, this Article reveals that the First
Amendment grants different types of speech comparable levels of
protection and that this level of protection is altogether quite moderate

including for political speech. The most salient and startling consequence
of exposing the hierarchy as a myth, therefore, is to uncover the
constitutionality of restricting dangerous political speech to safeguard

'Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2358 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("This Court's cases have provided heightened judicial
protection for political speech, public forums, and the expression of all viewpoints on any

given issue."); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
("[The First] Amendment gives its greatest protection to political beliefs, speech, and

association."); Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1955 (2018) (placing
criticism of government officials "high in the hierarchy of First Amendment values"); Snyder

v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) ("'[N]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance,' however, and where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First
Amendment protections are often less rigorous.") (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,

485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)); Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 42 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("That this speech and association for political purposes is the kind of activity to
which the First Amendment ordinarily offers its strongest protection is elementary." (emphasis

omitted)); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Our
First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of

speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position; commercial
speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of second-class
expression; obscenity and fighting words receive the least protection of all. Assuming that the
Court is correct that this last class of speech is not wholly 'unprotected,' it certainly does not
follow that fighting words and obscenity receive the same sort of protection afforded core

political speech." (emphasis omitted)); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)
("[S]peech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values,' and is entitled to special protection.") (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,

458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("[W]e

instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values .... "); Va. State Bd. of

Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (holding that the
differences between commercial speech and "other varieties" of speech mean "a different
degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial

information is unimpaired"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) ("The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression .... "); Monitor

Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971) ("[The First Amendment] has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.").
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the protection of democratic

governance.

The widely accepted view that political speech garners an
exceptionally high level of constitutional protection is flawed in two
ways. First, political speech does not enjoy an especially robust level of
protection from state interference. The vast majority of political speech is
routinely subject to significant government regulation or enjoys no First

Amendment protection at all-this includes political speech on public and
most private property, election speech, expressive political conduct,

political speech crimes, and the speech of millions of government
employees, students, and prisoners on matters of public importance.
Second, the First Amendment does not protect political speech to a greater
degree than it does non-political speech like cultural, commercial, or
"low-value" speech. Rather, all speech receives essentially equal
protection, notwithstanding judicial platitudes to the contrary.

This equal level of protection that all speech receives is best described
as "moderate." It permits, in effect, courts to moderate speech rights to

preserve democratic interests. From a doctrinal standpoint, moderate
protection looks a lot like intermediate scrutiny applied to all speech. But
"intermediate" does not quite capture what the Supreme Court is doing
when it extends moderate protection to speech. The Court is not simply
charting a middle road between strict scrutiny and rational basis review,
nor is it conducting a pure balancing inquiry or employing proportionality
review to speech regulations. Instead, it is applying a unique, substantive

standard that permits reasonable limits on speech that are necessary for
democracy to function. Under this substantive standard, the Court largely
defers to the government on whether a regulation is reasonable and
focuses, implicitly, on whether it is necessary to protect democratic
governance. This inquiry takes two forms: it can focus on safeguarding
effective governance or it can focus on protecting democratic
participation. The first requires subordinating speech rights to public
order and safety; the latter requires doing so to ensure a healthy and

informed public discourse. The result is a doctrine that equally permits
regulations

on any type of speech for these purposes,

in direct

contradiction to the hierarchical model of speech protection nominally
embraced by the Court throughout its First Amendment caselaw.
The hierarchy of speech protection is no more than a doctrinal myth.
The concept of myth is integral to understanding the hierarchy model.
Myths are widely held beliefs that are, at once, invented traditions and
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fictitious narratives.' The hierarchy of speech protection embodies both
elements of myth: it was invented out of whole cloth late in the
development of free speech jurisprudence and has since persisted as a
false narrative about how the First Amendment protects speech. Like most
myths, the hierarchy is real and not real; it is pretend in that it does not
control the outcome of cases, but it is powerful in that it continues to

propagate widely held, but mistaken, assumptions about free speech law. 3
This acoustic separation between myth and law has reached a critical
juncture. The digital age has transformed large swaths of human behavior
into speech, bringing more and more activity within the First

Amendment's protective sphere and shading distinctions between types
of speech. At the same time, the quantity of social and political speech
that poses serious risks to democracy, the economy, and a just society has

exploded. These developments demand regulations on speech, and yet the
hierarchy of speech protection claims to immunize just such speech from
regulation. Exposing the hierarchy as a doctrinal myth that does not
reflect the law or theory of free speech protection thus illuminates the
constitutional paths forward for regulating speech that risks serious social,

political, and commercial harms.
Unmasking this myth has particular ramifications for the regulation of
political speech. For decades the Supreme Court has perpetuated the
narrative that there is a gradation of speech protection and that political
speech receives the utmost protection from state interference. But its

rhetoric does not match its holdings. A close examination of the
protection afforded to political speech, both in the absolute and relative
to other types of speech, shows that this supposed cornerstone of First

Amendment law is more smoke and mirror than substantive rule. Indeed,
the ruse that political speech receives near-absolute protection is perhaps
the greatest misdirection accomplished by the hierarchy myth. In reality,

2 I use the phrase "invented tradition" much as Genevieve Lakier recently employed the
phrase to refer to a novel constitutional practice that is "justified on the basis of an alleged,
but ultimately fictitious, continuity with the past." The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128
Harv. L. Rev. 2166, 2168 (2015) (citation omitted). As Lakier notes, the phrase was coined

by historian Eric Hobsbawm, who defined the phenomenon as "responses to novel situations
which take the form of reference to old situations." Id. (quoting Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction:
Inventing Traditions, in The Invention of Tradition 1, 2 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger

eds., Canto ed. 1992)).
3 See infra Section 1.D (explaining that the myth influences popular culture, lower court
decisions, and many scholarly accounts of First Amendment doctrine).
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political speech receives a moderate level of judicial protection, equal to
that received by all other types of speech.
This tradition of extending equal and moderate protection to all speech
works well by allowing the Court to moderate free speech rights in the
interest of protecting democratic governance. But its potential is under-

realized and increasingly at risk because it remains hidden behind the
myth of the hierarchy of speech protection. By dismantling the myth,
scholars, legislators, and judges alike can begin to reconceptualize the
limits, and the possibilities, of speech regulations-including and
especially political speech regulations. The advantages of doing so are

manifold: it would put on the table some presumed off-the-wall
restrictions on false and malicious political speech, 4 and it would serve to
democratize speech protection by encouraging legislatures to claim a
greater share of the governing responsibility for protecting free speech.
This Article lays bare the hierarchy myth through a comprehensive
retelling of the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence. It explains

why the hierarchy was invented, why it did not take hold doctrinally, and
why it has nonetheless persisted rhetorically. In brief, the Court invented
the hierarchy in two steps over a pair of cases in 1976: Buckley v. Valeo
and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer

Council.5 First, in Buckley, the Court shifted the role of political speech
as core to the First Amendment to a new position as the highest value of
the Amendment. Then, in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court established a

counterposing point on this newly conceived spectrum of speech by
extending a supposedly lower level of protection to commercial speech.
What appeared in these cases as small rhetorical steps actually
represented a massive doctrinal leap.
The reason for this move inheres in the subject matter of the two cases
in which it appears. Buckley and Virginia Pharmacy "extended First
Amendment protection to campaign financing and to commercial speech,
respectively, and represented a tipping point in the post-New Deal
explosion of First Amendment coverage. Prior to these cases, the Court

did not purport to extend different levels of protection to different types
of protected speech. But the Court had spent the last forty years
4 See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, 26 Quinnipiac L.
Rev. 579, 579 (2008) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional Hardball] (understanding that the
conventions governing what legal claims are plausible "and which are 'off the wall"' are
influenced by "changing political, social, and historical conditions").
5 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976); infra Section I.A.

2022]

Equal Speech Protection

3 59

increasingly expanding equal First Amendment protection to speech

beyond core political speech-both by deepening coverage to semipolitical speech and widening coverage to other types of speech-so that

by 1976 the doctrine was sinking under its own weight and deeply in need
of an organizing framework. It was in this novel context that the Court
wholesale invented a hierarchy of speech protection, ordered according to
the speech's First Amendment value, out of what had been a diverse pool
of equally protected speech representing various First Amendment
values. 6

Lacking historical basis and in tension with other foundational
principles of free speech law, the hierarchy failed to take root and guide

the doctrine. Since its invention, the Supreme Court has continued to
extend a quite equal level of protection to all covered speech. This
equalization of speech protection results from two overriding trends: first,

the Court has continued to grant political speech mostly moderate, not
absolute, protection, permitting ample government regulation to facilitate

the safe exchange of political ideas. In recent decades, the Court has
reliably reaffirmed, or in some cases even lessened, this moderate level
of protection for political speech, contrary to prevailing criticisms. 7

Second, the Court has consistently elevated protection for non-political
speech to the same level as protection for political speech immediately or
soon after recognizing that speech as covered by the First Amendment.8
These two trends-maintaining moderate protection for political
speech and extending the same level of protection to non-political

speech-are themselves the inevitable consequence of applying the
patchwork of core doctrines that comprise First Amendment law. These
doctrines consist of a series of safety valves that funnel most political
speech restrictions to regulation-accommodating corners of the

jurisprudential landscape, as well as a series of neutral principles that
6 The

reasons undergirding the hierarchy's invention are discussed infra Section

I.A.

7 See, e.g., infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; Adam Liptak, Court's Free-Speech
Expansion Has Far-Reaching Consequences, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.ny
times.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech-expansion-has-far-reaching-consequen

ces.html [https://perma.cc/KX84-ALL5] (documenting the pervasive view among scholars
that the Court's recent free speech jurisprudence is sweeping and expansionist); Thomas B.
Edsall, Have Trump's Lies Wrecked Free Speech?, N.Y. Times (Jan. 6,2021), https://www.ny
times.com/2021/01/06/opinion/trump-lies-free-speech.html

[https://perma.cc/ZA75-NT3S]

(collecting opinions of numerous legal academics on the maximalist and far-reaching state of
First Amendment protections, especially for political speech).
8 A full explanation of these two trends follows infra Sections I.B and 1.C.
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resist drawing distinctions between types of speech. 9 Together, these

doctrines exert simultaneous pressure to ratchet down protection for
political speech and ratchet up protection for non-political speech to the
same level, all but ensuring that a hierarchy of speech protection could
never fully develop.
Scholars have previously pinpointed the 1970s as the moment in which
free speech doctrine became distorted in a number of significant ways.
For example, scholars have identified how the free speech cases of that
decade transformed the doctrine into one that vindicates corporate speech
rights, undermines economic regulations, and subordinates the interests
of citizens. 10 This Article identifies another doctrinal innovation that
occurred in this period: the Court's invention of a hierarchy of speech
protection and the ultimate failure of this new framework to guide free
speech law. This Article thus exposes the fallacy in the doctrinal truism
that political speech garners especially high protection, both in the
absolute and relative to other types of speech.
In so doing, this Article resituates the current scholarship on the
Court's recent appetite for overturning commercial regulations under the

First Amendment-a trend commonly termed the "Lochnerization" of the
First Amendment. The origins and consequences of this trend have been
widely discussed in recent years, almost entirely through a critical lens. 1
This Article offers a novel understanding of how Lochnerization actually
fits quite neatly, and in some ways beneficially, within the far larger trend
of maintaining equal speech protection amongst varying types of speech.

Where the Lochnerization sub-genre of First Amendment critique has
focused narrowly on the doctrinal developments (or distortions) of
commercial speech law, this Article makes clear that First Amendment

9

As discussed infra Sections I.B and LC, these doctrines include, among others the Article

will discuss: the time, place, and manner doctrine, Anderson-Burdick balancing, the O'Brien
standard, the rule against viewpoint- and content-based laws, and the principle of common
law analogical reasoning.
0 See, e.g., Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The

Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1389, 1393, 1396 (2017); Robert
Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith's First Amendment, 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 165, 167-72
(2015).
" See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First
Amendment, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 1953, 1962 (2018); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of
First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1915, 1917 (2016); Amanda Shanor, The
New Lochner, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 133, 135-36; Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment
Expansionism, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1199, 1207-09 (2015); Elizabeth Sepper, Free
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1453, 1455 (2015).
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Lochnerization is actually one piece of a larger doctrinal framework that

blurs distinctions between types of speech and renders restrictions on all
speech subject to moderate judicial protection. Specifically,
Lochnerization is one speech protection equalization tool among many
that functions as a means of ratcheting up protection for commercial

speech to the same level of protection enjoyed by all other types of
speech.

2

Finally, unlike the overwhelming majority of recent literature on the
trajectory of First Amendment doctrine, 1 3 the doctrinal manipulation this
Article identifies has the potential to be normatively valuable.
Recognizing that the hierarchy of speech protection and its attendant

truism that political speech garners near-absolute protection are doctrinal
myths clarifies the constitutionality of speech regulations aimed at
protecting a safe and healthy political discourse. It also excavates the
robust, but hidden, tradition of moderate and equal speech protection,
which this Article argues serves as a unifying "social democratic theory"
of free speech law.14
But it is important from the beginning to sharpen this Article's
assertion that the hierarchy of speech protection is a myth. The myth I

describe is a doctrinal myth-it is a legal principle that operates
rhetorically rather than analytically, meaning it has little descriptive value
for explaining the landscape of speech protection and little influence on
how the Supreme Court decides free speech cases. This is not to say that
the myth does not do any work. Most myths persist precisely because they
have social, political, and psychological power. The myth of the hierarchy

of speech protection is no different. It has bolstered the Court's power and
reputation as a guardian of speech rights and fostered a deeply ingrained
legal and popular culture of speech tolerance that shapes law and policy

2 See infra Subsection

1.C.1.

See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Madison's Music: On Reading the First Amendment (2015);
Richard L. Hasen, Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion
of American Elections (2016); Laurence Tribe & Joshua Matz, Uncertain Justice: The Roberts
Court and the Constitution 88-153 (2014); Steven H. Shiffrin, What's Wrong with the First
Amendment? (2016); Post & Shanor, supra note 10; Lee Epstein, William M. Landes
Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431 (2013);
Steven J. Heyman, The Third Annual C. Edwin Baker Lecture for Liberty, Equality, and
Democracy: The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 117 W.
13

Va. L. Rev. 231 (2014).
" See infra Section I1.B.
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decisions in legislatures and boardrooms every day. 5 The myth serves the
Court and free speech advocates and is also embraced by progressive
scholars attempting in good faith to stem the constitutional inoculation of
commercial activity from regulation. As this Article shows, however, the
hierarchy myth is self-defeating and precisely the wrong doctrinal
framework to accomplish progressive constitutional ends.
This Article also does not suggest that all speech regulations are
equally permissible. Viewpoint- and content-based regulations, for
example, are roundly prohibited. But such laws are equally prohibited
regardless of the underlying type of speech at issue. These rules are
therefore orthogonal to this Article's central observation that all speechpolitical and non-political alike-receives equal protection from
regulation. While there are only a few ways government may not regulate
any type of speech, there are many ways it can regulate all types of speech.

In declaring the hierarchy of speech protection a myth, this Article is
chiefly concerned with showing that, as a holistic framework for
understanding speech protection under the First Amendment, the
hierarchy is an invented tradition disguising a reality of routine
government supervision of speech boundaries.

Part I provides a descriptive account of the invention of the hierarchy
myth and its lack of substantive force in shaping the doctrine since its
creation. Section I.A briefly chronicles the post-New Deal trajectory of
First Amendment expansionism from the 1930s through the mid-1970s

and shows the absence of gradations in the level of protection afforded to
covered speech in this period.1 6 The remainder of Part I then details how
the newly invented tradition of a hierarchy of speech protection never
amounted to anything more than a doctrinal truism. It documents how all
types of speech are treated at essentially an equal, moderate level of
protection. First, Section I.B catalogues the numerous ways the doctrine

regularly, and uncontroversially, permits restrictions on political speech
that are necessary for democratic government to function. It illuminates
that most political speech is actually highly regulable under this standard,
15 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:

A Preliminary

Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1789-90 (2004) (explaining
the cultural "magnetism" of the First Amendment).
16 First Amendment "coverage" refers to whether a type of speech comes within the
protected ambit of the First Amendment at all, whereas First Amendment "protection" refers
to whether the speech is ultimately safeguarded from government regulation. Thus, prior to
1976, the question of whether speech was covered was largely synonymous with the question
of whether speech was protected. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.

2022]

Equal Speech Protection

363

directly refuting a core tenet of the hierarchy framework that political
speech garners strict constitutional protection. Section I.C then shows
how the hierarchy of speech protection is also false for purporting to

provide sequentially lesser protection to non-political speech. It explains
that most non-political speech garners the same level of protection as
political speech under various speech-specific doctrines and generally
applicable rules of free speech law that have the effect of ratcheting up
protection for non-political speech above what the rhetoric of the
hierarchy otherwise suggests. Finally, Section I.D offers possible
explanations for why the hierarchy myth has persisted and what
consequences it has had on speech protection.

Part II takes up the normative question of whether an equal speech
protection doctrine is desirable. It posits that equalizing speech
protection-and equalizing it at a level that permits significant though
specific legislative control over speech-is ultimately beneficial for

maintaining a healthy speech environment and thus a healthy democracy.
An equal speech framework is superior to any purported hierarchy of
speech model for essentially two reasons, discussed in Sections II.A and
II.B respectively. First, there is little practical or constitutional difference
between political and non-political speech, making any attempt to

distinguish speech by type a doomed and unwise task. Second,
acknowledging that political speech is, and should be, afforded a
moderate level of protection will foster a more democratic, egalitarian,
and resilient First Amendment. It would invite legal reforms aimed at

safeguarding the stability and vitality of our public discourse, including
reforms addressing the proliferation of disinformation and toxic speech.

Recent scholarship has gone far to document the undemocratic and
inegalitarian effects of current First Amendment doctrine17 but has
struggled to identify a constitutionally compelling alternative. 18 This

" See, e.g., Kessler & Pozen, supra note 11, at 1959-60; Leslie Kendrick, Another First
Amendment, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2095, 2098-2100 (2018); Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an

Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2118 (2018); Jedediah Purdy,
Beyond the Bosses' Constitution: The First Amendment and Class Entrenchment, 118 Colum.

L. Rev. 2161, 2162 (2018).
is Kessler & Pozen, supra note 11, at 1960; Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the
First Amendment, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1053, 1072 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Cultural
Democracy] ("[T]he challenge for liberty theorists has always been to give an account of
freedom of speech that explains why it should have special constitutional value that traditional
economic freedoms do not enjoy."). In the early 1990s, scholars including Owen Fiss, Cass
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Article does just that by focusing on reinterpreting the doctrine, as
opposed to reinventing it. Properly understood, our current free speech
doctrine is one of equal speech protection; and properly applied, this

doctrine has enormous potential to produce egalitarian outcomes in which
the vast majority of average citizens' public discourse and democratic

participation is affirmatively protected by legislatures from interference
and manipulation. Thus, while doctrinal recitations by courts and
commentators have long described a hierarchy of greater and lesser
protected speech under the First Amendment, I show, by exposing its

historical invention and its negligible impact on actual judicial decisions,
how the hierarchical First Amendment is a sham. Instead, in origin,
purpose, and application, the First Amendment prescribes equal treatment

of varied kinds of speech, and making this clear can sharpen and improve
advocacy, decisions, and responses to calls for reform.
I. THE HIERARCHY MYTH: POLITICAL SPEECH PROTECTION AND ITS
RELATION TO THE PROTECTION OF

OTHER SPEECH

The myth of the hierarchy of speech protection comprises two general
principles: that political speech receives the upmost protection from

government regulation and that other speech receives progressively less
protection in accordance with its constitutional value for enhancing public
discourse. This Part documents how both propositions are false. Political
speech roundly receives moderate levels of protection from government

interference; and non-political speech, such as commercial, cultural, and
"low-value" speech, receives comparably equal levels of protection as
political speech. Beginning with why the hierarchy model was adopted
and then showing how it does not accurately describe the law of free
speech protection, this Part then concludes by exploring why the
hierarchy failed to gain traction and what the implications are of its
persistence as a doctrinal myth.

Sunstein, and Robert Post began reviving the collectivist theory of free speech in the spirit of
Alexander Meiklejohn, understanding the essential objective of the First Amendment to be the

promotion of a rich and valuable public debate and democratic deliberation. This progressive
effort to reform First Amendment doctrine may have been, counterintuitively,
counterproductive. By elevating democratic deliberation to the apex of First Amendment
protection, these efforts reinforced a conception of a tiered system of protection that,
ultimately, kept courts in the driver's seat of guarding the political process against political

reforms. See infra Section II.B.
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A. Inventing a Tradition

The hierarchy of speech protection myth was invented in 1976, but its
roots are grounded in the free speech revolution of the 1930sspecifically in that era's newly adopted rationale for extending heightened
judicial protection to political speech as necessary to safeguard the
democratic process.1 9 The history of political speech protection prior to

this period is rich and complex and quite beyond the scope of this Article,
except to note that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Supreme Court

caselaw largely adhered to a tradition of extending scant judicial
protection to all speech, both political and non-political alike. 20 The

general, long-standing rule was that the government could broadly
suppress speech when it rationally threatened public harm but could not

enjoin such speech in advance except in extreme circumstances. 21 To the
extent there were gradations in the level of protection different types of
speech received, that was more a matter of legislative prerogative than

judicial mandate.2 2
Then, during the New Deal, a perfect storm of political dynamics, legal
quagmires over the framework for protecting rights, and personnel

changes on the Supreme Court ushered in a new era of constitutional
jurisprudence that transformed judicial protection for the freedom of

speech. The Court abandoned its strict defense of economic liberty against
social and commercial legislation on the basis that this exercise of judicial
review was too undemocratic. Part and parcel to this transformation was

a simultaneous move to heighten judicial protection for political rights to
ensure a well-functioning legislative process. The First Amendment in

particular took on a preferred position in the ordering of constitutional
rights that entitled it to greater judicial protection on the theory that such

19 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 932, 95860, 973 (1919) (developing the theory that a system of free expression is a cornerstone of the
democratic process and thus vital to the survival of a democratic society); Abrams v. United

States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (adopting Chafee's theory that the
free trade in ideas is integral to a democratic society); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
369 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943); Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to
Self-Government 38-39 (1948).
20 See, e.g., Lakier, supra note 2, at 2179-92.
21 Id. at 2195; see also Schenck v. United States., 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) (replacing the
previous restraints test with the new clear and present danger test).
22 Lakier, supra note 2, at 2196.

366

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 108:353

protection is necessary to safeguard the role of political speech in the
political process.

This theory of heightened protection for speech based on the
democratic value of political speech launched a decades-long expansion
of First Amendment protection. As this Section details in brief, the Court
subsequently recognized more and more speech as politically valuable,

and therefore as protected, which had the effect of collapsing distinctions
between types of speech and creating increasing pressure to decrease the

overall level of protection for speech. In 1976, this pressure came to a
head. The solution the Court contrived was to introduce a hierarchical
system of speech protection that would indeed grant political speech
heightened judicial protection, in line with the "preferred position" theory
of free speech, without subjecting to strict judicial scrutiny regulations on

other types of speech more properly left to democratic control. To
understand the invention of this hierarchy, and why it rested on such
unstable footing, it is first necessary to understand the doctrinal grounds
on which it was built.

A sea change in modern free speech law began gradually in the 1930s
and picked up steam in the 1940s. The nature of the change occurred on
two interconnected fronts: the Court ratcheted up protection for political
speech and at the same time expanded the scope of political speech

entitled to that protection. 23 First, the Court increased protection for
political speech by requiring a showing of clear and imminent danger to
punish it, rejecting its older precedents that allowed the state to punish
speech that risked only amorphous or remote harm to the state.24
Additionally, the Court began broadening the scope of political speech
entitled to this new level of protection by accepting that government must
tolerate a larger swath of speech-from subversive political speech to
tangentially political speech-in order to create sufficient breathing room

23

This change did not happen in a vacuum but was spurred on by calculated strategy

decisions from civil liberties advocates seeking to achieve legal victories through the courts.
See generally Laura Weinrib, The Taming of Free Speech: America's Civil Liberties
Compromise (2016) (documenting how labor, business, and advocacy lawyers worked to
make judicial enforcement of the First Amendment central to American democracy); Mark A.

Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism (1991)
(detailing how the civil libertarian strand of free speech law, championed by progressive jurist
Zechariah Chafee, dominated the post-WWI period of free speech development).
24 See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258-59 (1937) (rejecting government's authority
to punish a communist organizer for insurrection); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 32022 (1957) (adopting the clear and present danger test with an imminence requirement).
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for speech that promotes the First Amendment values of democratic
governance, self-expression, and the advancement of truth.25 Beginning
with Stromberg v. California, one of the first cases upholding the First

Amendment speech right against government punishment, the Court
recognized the display of a political "sign, symbol, or emblem" as
protected political speech. 26 The recognition of non-verbal and nontextual symbols as protected speech marked a first step down a slippery

slope of expanding protection to more and more kinds of political
expression. Within less than a decade, the inertia of this trend rapidly
drove First Amendment coverage beyond pure political speech to
encompass speech on "all matters of public concern." 27 By the first half
of the 1940s, the Court protected labor picketing, 28 religious solicitation,

offensive religious proselytizing, 29 refusing to salute the flag in public
schools, 30 and door-to-door peddling3 1 as speech akin to political
expression in constitutional value and thus entitled to equal constitutional
protection.

These advancements in speech protection did not, however, grant
political speech anything close to absolutist protection. Even as the Court

expanded the First Amendment's reach, it just as often reaffirmed the
government's ample authority and discretion to regulate speech for public

safety and orderly participation in democratic discourse. For example, the
Court upheld the government's power to prohibit a small, single-file
religious and political march on a public sidewalk; 32 offensive political
speech in public against a government official;3 3 and the use of a sound
truck to comment on a local labor dispute.3 4 Thus, while the Court
2

Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (protecting the display of political

signs and symbols "to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people

and that changes may be obtained by lawful means"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1940) (protecting labor picketing as an "issue[] about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period").
26 283 U.S. at 369.

Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101-02.
Id. at 105 (labor picketing); Am. Fed'n of Lab. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1941)
(labor picketing by non-employees).
29 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310-11 (1940) (applying same clear and present
27

28

danger test for political speech to religious expression).

30 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

31 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1943); see also Kessler, supra note 11,
at 1956-76 (discussing the series of peddling tax cases in 1942 and 1943).
32 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 572, 576 (1941).
33 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 574 (1942).
34 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
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undoubtably ratcheted up protection for political speech in this period
above its pre-New Deal level, it nonetheless left considerable room for
government regulation of protected speech.

What emerged from the 1930s-1940s free speech revolution, therefore,
was a three-dimensional transformation that increased protection for
political speech, extended this same protection further and further beyond
core political speech, but also preserved significant government authority
to police deleterious speech, regardless of its political nature.
This trajectory continued unabated for the next several decades,
leading the Court to extend equal First Amendment protection to an ever-

increasing amount of artistic, religious, technological, profane, libelous,
and obscene speech, often by obfuscating the distinction between these
types of speech and political speech. First, in the 1950s, the Court

extended protection to a large and diverse amount of speech by
significantly narrowing the categories of unprotected speech. For
example, in Beauharnaisv. Illinois, the Court upheld the crime of group

libel but re-characterized the category narrowly as only libel likely to
cause violence and disorder.3 5 It did the same for the categories of
profanity, 36 blasphemy,3 7

and obscenity.38 In all these cases, the

underlying rationale was that "ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion"39 are nonetheless protected
because they may advance "truth, science, morality, and arts in general,
[and the] diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of

Government." 4 0 Speech's political potential, therefore, protected it as
equal to political speech.
The trend of simultaneously granting heightened protection to core
political speech while stretching the reach of that protection further and
further afield reached its apex in the 1960s and early 1970s. In those years,
the Court doubled down on its protection for political speech in more
provocative contexts, including political assemblies that obstruct public
streets, 41 political speech by students in public school, 4 2 and lewd and
3
36
37

38
39
40
41

42

343 U.S. 250, 254, 258 (1952).
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
Id.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487-89 (1957).
Id. at 484.
Id. (quoting 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774)).
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
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profane political speech. 43 It simultaneously recognized ever more
polemical and scandalous speech as socially and politically valuable, and
thus entitled it to an equal level of protection. These were the years in

which the category of unprotected obscenity all but vanished,"
defamation acquired new constitutional armor,4 1 threatening and violent
speech was shielded from prosecution, 46 and even the publication of
classified national security information withstood government
interference. 47 So great was the explosion of free speech expansionism
that the strained ties binding political speech to all these other types of
speech finally snapped, and the Court ultimately dropped the pretense of
protecting non-political speech as a means of protecting potentially

political speech: "[T]he First Amendment does not protect speech and
assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political. 'Great
secular causes, with smaller ones, are guarded.'"48

Still, the government retained ample authority to regulate destructive
speech throughout these decades. Communist political activity, in
particular, continued to be lawfully inhibited when it threatened

4" Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671
(1973) (per curiam).

44 See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y

Gen. of Mass. (Memoirs v. Massachusetts), 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion);
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770 (1967) (per curiam); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973) (cabining unprotected obscenity only to works which "depict or describe sexual
conduct" and "which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious

literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"); see also John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary
Effects Doctrine, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 291, 297 (2009) ("[B]y recognizing some First Amendment
protection for non-obscene pornography, and by narrowing the definition of obscenity so as
to exclude most pornography for practical purposes, the Supreme Court had raised mainstream
pornography to the same status as political speech, subject to all the same First Amendment
rules.").
4

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (requiring a heightened standard

of actual malice to sustain a claim of defamation against the press for false statements).
46 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (protecting speech
advocating for the use of force or law violation so long as it was not "directed to inciting or

producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
47 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam).

4 United Mine Workers v. Ill. Bar Ass'n, 389 U. S. 217, 223 (1967) (quoting Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945)); see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
814 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The notion that economic and political concerns are
separable is pre-Victorian.").
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interference with state and economic security. 49 New or socially
detrimental forms of speech also remained subject to a meaningful degree
of government control in order to balance speech rights, public welfare,
and the unknown dangers of new forms of speech technology.50 And more
radical political activity, including certain civil rights demonstrations,
was denied First Amendment protection in favor of the government's
interest in maintaining social order.5 ' The most accurate summation of the
doctrine in this period, therefore, is that it extended a moderate level of
protection to all speech, with no gradations in the level of speech

49

Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 411-12 (1950) (upholding the Taft-

Hartley Act's requirement that labor union leaders make an anti-communist oath); Dennis v.

United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (upholding a Smith Act conviction for active
advocacy of the overthrow of the government by communist leaders); Adler v. Bd. of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485, 490, 496 (1952) (upholding a New York law preventing members of the
Communist Party from teaching in public schools); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
134 (1959) (declining to protect the refusal to give congressional testimony to the House

Committee on Un-American Activities); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959) (declining
to protect the refusal to produce information under subpoena in an investigation into suspected
Communist associations); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 205-06 (1961) (upholding a
Smith Act conviction for membership in the Communist Party); Konigsberg v. State Bar of

Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 39, 56 (1961) (declining to protect the refusal to answer questions about
membership in the Communist Party as a condition of bar admission); In re Anastaplo, 366
U.S. 82, 97 (1961) (same); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 435 (1961) (declining to
protect the refusal to testify before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities

Committee).
50 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (speech inciting a breach of the peace);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261 (1952) (provocative, libelous speech against a race
or religion); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957) (obscenity); Int'l Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 293 (1957) ("coerc[ive]" picketing for an unlawful
purpose); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 44, 49 (1961) (screening films
without first submitting them to government censors); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502,
503-04 (1966) (publishing obscene books); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968) (speech critical of government by public employees); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969) (upholding the fairness doctrine); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (upholding ban on importing obscene material).
51 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (upholding criminal trespass conviction for
demonstrating against prison segregation on jailhouse grounds); Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967) (upholding criminal conviction for disobeying
injunction against demonstrating in a civil rights march); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 369-70, 372 (1968) (upholding criminal prohibition on burning a draft card in protest of
the Vietnam War). For a richer exposition on the lack of First Amendment protection for those

fighting for racial justice, see Justin Hansford, The First Amendment Freedom of Assembly
as a Racial Project, 127 Yale L.J.F. 685 (2018).
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protection afforded to different types of covered speech.

2

Put another

way, the question of speech protection was synonymous with the question

of speech coverage in these decades-once speech came within the ambit
of the First Amendment, it enjoyed an equal, moderate level of judicial
protection. Thus, when the Court invented the hierarchy of speech
protection in the mid-1970s, it not only invented a tradition of different
levels of speech protection but also invented a tradition that political
speech occupies an invulnerable position at the apex of this hierarchy.
So why invent the hierarchy at this moment in the development of free
speech law? It was the explosion of First Amendment coverage-which
conferred significant protection on a vast and diverse array of speech-

that ultimately necessitated (1) a new theory for why all manner of nonpolitical speech was protected and (2) a new means of ensuring that free
speech, so widely defined, could coexist with democratic governance.
The new theory that developed was that the First Amendment protected
not just self-expression and self-governance but also the availability of
information in society. 53 The new way of managing this vast scope of

protected information became the hierarchical model of speech
protection.
Both this novel explanation for First Amendment coverage and the new

hierarchical model of speech protection were invented in a set of
blockbuster 1976 cases, Buckley v. Valeo and Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.54 First, in Buckley, the
Court shifted its rhetoric slightly from describing protection for political
speech as central to the First Amendment to describing political speech,

Most scholars hail the Warren Court period as a bastion of free speech progressivism.
While some scholars have surfaced the Court's far more mixed record of protecting political
52

speech in this period, their accounts are more supplemental than revisionist. See, e.g., Louis

Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2219, 2229-30
(2018); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82
Va. L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1996); Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime
(2004).

1 This new explanation was perhaps best crystalized in the 1978 case FirstNationalBank
of Boston v. Bellotti, wherein the Court identified "[t]he inherent worth of speech in terms of
its capacity for informing the public" and reframed its cases as emphasizing not only "the role
of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also .. . its role in affording
the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas." 435
U.S. 765, 777, 783 (1978). The First Amendment, the Court explained, thus "goes beyond
protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from
limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw." Id. at 783.
4 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

372

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:353

in relative terms, as meriting "the broadest protection."5 5 The Court did
not cite or quote any case for this new formulation. It instead relied on
precedents that had only ever identified protection for political speech as
fundamental to, or a major purpose of, the First Amendment, but not as
occupying a comparatively privileged constitutional position relative to
other protected speech. 56
Having introduced the concept of a hierarchy of speech in Buckley, the
Court then gave it legs in Virginia Pharmacy by establishing a second,
and lower, point on this newly created scale of speech protection.
Employing the same free speech expansionism tactic it had perfected over

the past several decades, the Court extended First Amendment protection
to commercial speech by correlating it with political speech and eliding
the possibility of drawing any clear line between the two. 7 It compared
commercial speech to political speech expressed for economic interests,

such as labor picketing, books sold for profit, and handbills soliciting
funds for religious and political causes. 58 It also grounded protection for
commercial speech in the same rationales undergirding protection for

political speech, claiming that the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable to the "administration of Government," 59 because in a "free

5 424 U.S. at 14.
Id. ("[A] major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs .... " (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (identifying a "profound national commitment" in
the First Amendment "to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection
given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people."); see also Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S. 116, 135-36 (1966) ("The manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative
56

government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on

issues of policy."); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people ... is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."). Only one
case prior to Buckley, which Buckley quotes, suggested that speech protection is organized
hierarchically. That case, MonitorPatriot Co. v. Roy, states: "[l]t can hardly be doubted that
the constitutional guarantee [of free speech] has its fullest and most urgent application

precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). Monitor
Patriotwas also decided in the 1970s and also does not cite any supporting caselaw for the
proposition that First Amendment protection applies to varying degrees depending on the
speech at issue.
57 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 ("[N]o line between publicly 'interesting' or 'important'
commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn.").
5 Id. at 761-62.
59 Id. at 762 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 484).
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enterprise economy," it is "a matter of public interest" that "private

economic decisions" be "intelligent and well informed" to ensure "the
proper allocation of resources" and "the formation of intelligent opinions

as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered." 60
Then, for the first time, the Court explicitly distinguished its holding
that commercial speech merits protection like political speech from the

conclusion that commercial speech merits the same protection as political
speech. Buried in a footnote, it acknowledged the "commonsense
differences between speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction' . . . and other varieties. "61 It then delivered the sentence that

finally severed the questions of coverage and protection from one another
and completed the construction of a new hierarchy of speech protection:

it reaffirmed that the differences between commercial and political speech
do not justify a difference in First Amendment coverage, but "nonetheless
suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary."62
The conventional wisdom is that the Court finally broke down the
barrier between political and commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy

and thereby eliminated the last major wall between protected and
unprotected information. But, in fact, the Court tried to create a middle
ground via the hierarchy model. It tried to extend equal coverage without
extending equal protection. As the next two Sections will show, however,

the ground on which the Court attempted to build this hierarchy was
entirely unstable. Divorced from precedent and incompatible with the
majority of free speech doctrine, the hierarchy did not take hold. It
managed to influence the analysis and resolution of a few cases in the
immediate years following its introduction; 63 but, by the 1980s, it had

60

Id. at 765.

61 Id. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Hum. Rels., 413

U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
62 Id. at 772 n.24.
63 See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(bestowing lesser First Amendment protections on adult speech because such "expression is
of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political
debate .... [F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the

citizen's right to see [adult films] .... "); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457
(1978) (treating in-person solicitation of legal services as commercial advertising entitled to
less protection than other speech). The hierarchy may also have done some work in the
outcome of FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, which recognized a First Amendment
right of corporations to make contributions to ballot initiative and referendum campaigns. 435
U.S. 765, 767 (1978). The Court's reasoning relied in part on reverse-engineering a corporate
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failed to acquire any analytical heft and settled into a position of rhetorical
platitude.
B. Top-Down Equalization:Moderate Protectionfor PoliticalSpeech

Prior to the invention of the hierarchy of speech protection, all speech
garnered a moderate level of protection with the government retaining
significant discretion to impose regulations on speech in order to ensure

public order and a healthy democratic discourse. After the hierarchy was
introduced, this did not change. Political speech has acquired neither strict
protection nor a comparatively high level of protection as compared to
other speech. It continues to enjoy moderate protection at the same level

as other speech, and the government continues to retain ample discretion
to regulate speech to safeguard the health and security of the public
sphere. As this Section will show, the few "seminal" cases seemingly to
the contrary are at once anomalous and also not as speech-protective as
their reputations suggest.

This Section walks through various types of political speech-which
together comprise the overwhelming

majority of political speech

expressed-to show how all this political speech is reasonably and
moderately protected from government interference, to the same degree

as other speech spoken in that same context, with the government
retaining significant authority to control for the potential public and
democratic harms that such speech might inflict. To reiterate, the
argument makes no claim that the government may regulate political

speech in any way it desires but rather that it may and regularly does
regulate political speech in myriad ways to advance legitimate interests
in democratic governance. These interests specifically include
maintaining well-functioning governmental systems and safe and
informed democratic processes.

Such regulations on speech routinely restrict the majority of political
speech expressed. They often disproportionately impact certain
viewpoints. Some are overly harsh or ill-conceived from a policy

standpoint. And occasionally the Supreme Court errs in its application of
moderate scrutiny to these laws. But none of these issues detract from the

political speech right from corporations' established commercial speech rights based on the
hierarchy of speech. Id. at 784 n.20 ("Appellee would invert the debate by giving
constitutional significance to a corporation's 'hawking of wares' while approving criminal

sanctions for a bank's expression of opinion on a tax law of general public interest.").
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central claim advanced here-that the vast majority of political speech is
not absolutely protected from regulation and receives no preferred
position compared to other speech. The takeaway from this analysis is
clear: any notion that political speech garners superlative protection from

government regulation is a myth that masks the doctrine's regular and
prodigious support for government regulations of political speech to

foster a healthy, orderly, and vibrant public discourse.
1. Core PoliticalSpeech

For all the doctrine's emphasis on protecting political speech and doing
so specifically "for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people," 64 the exact type of political speech most utilized
for, and most influential in, accomplishing this pursuit receives only
moderate protection from government regulation. Core political speech in
a democracy is speech used to participate in elections, campaigns, and

political debates or advocacy over the administration of government. The
most basic and powerful means of using one's voice to engage in these
democratic processes are through political organizing and petition,

campaign contributions and expenditures, running for office,
participating in a public civic debate, and, of course, voting. 65 Yet each
one of these essential modes of political speech falls within a highly
regulable sphere of government discretion and authority.
Beginning with the most common forms of political advocacypetition signing, vote solicitation, and campaign donations-the state

retains significant discretion to ensure such political participation is
orderly, noncoercive, and transparent. These interests supersede the
burdens they impose on political speech, including the administrative
onus of complying with disclosure requirements and the hardships of

public backlash. 66 The First Amendment does not even provide robust
64 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
65

See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 191 (2014) ("There is no right more basic in our

democracy than the right to participate in electing our political leaders. Citizens can exercise
that right in a variety of ways: They can run for office themselves, vote, urge others to vote
for a particular candidate, volunteer to work on a campaign, and contribute to a candidate's

campaign.").
66 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370-71 (2010) (upholding disclaimer and
disclosure requirements for independent expenditures and electioneering where there is no

reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals); id. at 480-85 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 199-202 (2010); see
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protection against government retaliation for such speech, requiring a

relatively high standard of proof to remedy claims of official retaliation
for political expression. 67 The Court has also tolerated states' efforts to

prevent coercive and disorderly political advocacy, such as by banning
judicial campaign solicitations or posting political posters on telephone

poles. 68 This is true even where the line between coercion and persuasion
is difficult to draw, like when states create "campaign-free" buffers
around polling locations 69 or "protest zones" at political events. 70 These
also Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Trump's Critics Are Targeting His Donors, Sparking Fears of a
Backlash Against Disclosure, Wash. Post (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/president-trumps-critics-are-weaponizing-information-about-his-donors-raising-conc

erns-about-federal-donor-disclosure-requirements/2019/09/1 0/b0b60ff8-cfe4-l 1 e9-87fa-850
1 a456c003_story.html [https://perma.cc/2NS2-YZQP] (describing shaming campaigns
targeting disclosed donors to President Trump); Greg St. Martin, Brand Identity, Trump

Boycotts,

and

Social

Media

Backlash,

News@Northeastern

(Feb.

16,

2017),

https://news.northeastern.edu/2017/02/16/brand-identity-trump-boycotts-and-social-media-

backlash/ [https://perma.cc/J7RT-7CKY] (discussing popular boycotts of businesses seen as
supporting President Trump). But see Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,64-65 (1960) (striking
down an ordinance requiring that all handbills identify the person who published or distributed
them); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (relying on a rich
history of anonymous political literature and government reprisal to strike down broad
identification requirements on political literature, at least where the literature is not misleading

and the identification of the author does little to advance the reader's evaluation of the
document).
67 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977)
(establishing a but-for causation and burden-shifting standard of liability for official retaliation
whereby the plaintiff must plead that animus towards speech was a substantial factor in the

retaliatory action taken before the burden shifts to the government to show the action would
have been taken regardless of the speech).
66 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 437 (2015) (upholding ban on judicial
candidates personally soliciting campaign funds); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984) (upholding ban on posting signs to telephone poles as
applied to a political campaign flier).
69
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding law requiring solicitors to stand
100 feet from polling places in order to prevent intimidation and fraud).
70 See, e.g., Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2019) (upholding state

trooper's use of a protest zone outside a private event); Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d

1113, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding an order restricting protests against the World Trade
Organization); Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2013) (upholding a decision
to move a group protesting a presidential visit to a protest zone); see also Wood v. Moss, 572
U.S. 744, 748-49 (2014) (displacing protestors to a location further away from President Bush
than his supporters did not violate clearly established First Amendment law); Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 714 (2000) (upholding a buffer zone around abortion clinics); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (reviewing buffer zones under
intermediate scrutiny). Most "free speech zone" policies are reviewed under the deferential

time, place, and manner standard for speech restrictions on public property, discussed infra
Subsection I.B.4.
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regulations aim to safeguard political speech in the aggregate by ensuring
that political participation remains voluntary, safe, and informed.

Nowhere has the Court been more lenient on government interference
with core political speech than in its acquiescence to regulations on the
most quintessential form of political expression: voting itself. The
framework governing the tension between political speech rights and
election administration is a government-friendly test known as AndersonBurdick balancing.7 1 This test, which applies to nearly every voting rule
or procedure, requires a simple weighing of the burdens on speech as

compared to the benefits of the regulation. No extra weight is given to the
protection of the political speech at issue, nor is any heightened scrutiny
or narrow tailoring requirement applied to the regulation in question. It is

under this framework that states routinely impose order on the electoral
process by denying candidates with little support access to the ballot and
to debate stages. 72 It also permits states significant discretion to determine
the time periods for voting, the prerequisites and procedures for casting a

ballot, and even the requirements for whom a citizen may vote for73 -all

of which have an enormous impact on the most powerful exercise of
political expression in the interest of ensuring a safe and orderly election

system. 74
7' The test is named for the two Supreme Court cases that established it: Anderson v.

Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,434 (1992).
72 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see also Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 584, 586 (2005)
(upholding Oklahoma's semi-closed primary system); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479
U.S. 189, 190-91, 194 (1986) (upholding requirement that minor-party candidates receive at
least one percent of votes in a primary for their name to appear on the general election ballot);

Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 282-83, 288-90 (1992) (upholding a signature requirement to
get a political party on the ballots); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,

353-54, 358 (1997) (upholding anti-fusion laws preventing candidates from being listed on
the ballot multiple times as members of different parties); Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (holding under a comparably lenient standard of review that
a public television broadcaster could exclude an independent political candidate from a

debate).
73 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433; Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197
(2008).
74 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Three Pathologies of American Voting Rights Illuminated
by the COVID-19 Pandemic, and How to Treat and Cure Them, 19 Election L.J. 263, 264
(2020) (noting that voting rights protections in the United States are weak and subject to
inconsistent judicial control); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:

Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643, 673 (1998) (critiquing the
doctrine as allowing states to raise the cost of political defection and entrench political power);

Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 631, 652 (2007) (explaining how
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Even where the lenient Anderson-Burdick test does not apply,

abstention doctrines often leave undisturbed government restrictions on
citizens' ability to engage in political expression. 75 For example, the

Court recently announced that the political question doctrine prevents the
federal judiciary from reviewing political gerrymandering, leaving states

free to depress the political association and speech of their residents by
gerrymandering them into districts designed to minimize their political
efficacy. 76 Similarly, the doctrine of qualified immunity frequently
shields government actions that burden citizens' political speech rights
especially their protest rights. 77 Where abstention grants state actors room
to limit speech rights to advance democratic equality, it fits comfortably
within the dominant tradition of extending moderate protection to
political speech to preserve legislatures' ability to safeguard democratic
processes. Where, on the other hand, it leaves in place undemocratic
systems of speech suppression, as the partisan gerrymandering cases did,

it functions as an anomalous and distortive force in the doctrine.
Finally, and perhaps most unexpectedly, compelled political speech is
not as protected as the more conventionally cited caselaw in this area
would suggest. The Court has stood firm against attempts by the state to
use individuals as mouthpieces for its own political messages and to
dictate the content of individuals' political expression.78 But compelled
political disclosures are ubiquitous, and indirect compelled political
speech remains routine and permissible where it is required for the
government to effectively carry out important public programs. For
example, state entities commonly impose fees on certain segments of the
voter identification requirements disproportionately impact protected classes of voters and are

based largely on anecdote and misleading intuitive arguments).
75 As do doctrines of statutory construction. See, e.g., Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants,
140 S. Ct. 2335, 2352-55 (2020) (applying severability principles to uphold a challenged ban
on political robocalls, thereby equalizing protection for pure political speech and government
debt collection speech).
76 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506-07 (2019).
77 See Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 747, 764 (2014); see also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.
658, 660, 670 (2012) (shielding officers who arrested a suspect, with probable cause, but in
retaliation for political speech through qualified immunity).
78 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding the
First Amendment protects against being compelled to salute the flag and say the pledge of
allegiance); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (striking down requirement to
display the state motto "Live Free or Die" on a license plate); Mia. Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974) (striking down a "right of reply" law which granted
political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the
criticisms published).
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population and then use these fees to fund political activity, transforming
the compelled fees into compelled support for political speech. State
university student fees, 79 state bar fees, 80 and industry fees that fund
public ad campaigns 81 often operate in this way as indirect forms of
compelled political speech. 82 Moreover, in the context of corporate
political speech, the First Amendment effectively requires a corporation's

shareholders to subsidize the corporation's political speech. 83
Viewed in context, therefore, the few cases that appear to give outsized
protection to electioneering activity-namely, to campaign financingare quite anomalous. They are not reflective of the general rule that

governments have wide latitude to regulate citizens'

expressive

participation in the electoral process. But the anomaly is not altogether

off-trend. Like the bulk of the caselaw in this area, these cases also permit
the subordination of individual political speech rights to safeguard others'
voices in the political process-in the context of campaign financing,

however, citizens' speech is subordinated to enhance corporate speech,
not to enhance other citizens' speech by ensuring an orderly and inclusive
political process. By equalizing the political speech rights of corporations
and citizens, the Court has again acquiesced to a regulatory regime that

restricts individuals' political speech rights and the influence of their
political expression under the First Amendment. 84 In this context,

however, the Court has minimized the political influence of citizens and
even sanctioned the compelled political speech of citizens who are
shareholders to vindicate corporate speech interests as opposed to public.
79 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 US 217, 233-34 (2000).

80 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990).
8' Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 557-60 (2005).
82 The end point in this line of precedent is compelled taxation, which enjoys no First
Amendment protection. Id. at 559.
" Of course, shareholders are not required to invest in any corporation, but neither is a
citizen required to attend a state university, become a barred attorney, or participate in an

industry subject to state fees. In only one similar area-that of labor dues-has the Court cut
back on the state's ability to compel indirect subsidization of political speech. Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211, 235 (1977) (striking down compelled dues that fund
a public union's political activity); Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459-60 (2018) (striking down all mandatory public union dues-even
those that fund ostensibly non-political activities like salary and benefits negotiation-as
unconstitutional compelled subsidization of political speech).
84 Dissenting Justices in campaign finance cases have recognized and forcefully criticized

this effect. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 467, 475-79 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); 1st Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
809, 815-16 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
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interests in democratic self-governance. So even as the Court routinely
invokes the language of the hierarchy and of the Constitution's special
solicitude for political speech in these cases, it again is not meaningfully
protecting political speech rights.
Thus, in the majority of circumstances, protection for pure political
speech-meaning speech in the context of participating directly in the

political process-does not enjoy anywhere near absolute protection.
Rather, the state enjoys considerable flexibility to restrict political speech
in order to administer fair, safe, and transparent elections, as well as to
promote orderly and informed political debate. At the margins, this level
of protection has allowed states to place a thumb on the scale of advancing
certain political messages, and certain citizens' political power, over
others. This is no small concern, and it is a reason to oppose some election

laws and to reassess specific applications of the doctrines discussed when
they disparately disempower minority groups or corrupt the democratic
process. But regardless of any missteps in specific cases, the caselaw

overall is clear: the most fundamental and widely employed exercises of
political speech in a democracy are routinely subject to significant
regulation that, at its best, aims to ensure a fair, transparent, and orderly
political process.
2. PoliticalSpeech by "InstitutionalSpeakers"

The assumption that political speech garners outsized protection in
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is especially flawed as applied to tens of

millions of citizens, namely government employees, students, the
incarcerated, and electronic media providers. The caselaw has quietly
created a class of "institutional speakers" out of these groups, deeming
their speech in greater need of regulation due to the institutional context
in which they operate.

Their political speech rights are roundly

subordinated to the interests of the state in the orderly administration of
its duties and in the interests of the public in a free and informed political
discourse.
To start, both these interests play a pivotal role in validating regulations
on the political speech of the over twenty million Americans8 5 who work

85 Employment Trend (Quarter-to-Quarter), U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. (June 2020),
https://www.fedscope.opm.gov/ [https://perma.cc/DW7K-M54Q] (showing 2.1 million
federal employees in 2020); Elizabeth Dippold et al., Annual Survey of Public Employment
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as government employees. The First Amendment permits government
employers-from police departments, to schools, to social service
agencies-to regulate the political speech of its employees where there is

justification for treating the employee differently from a member of the
general public. 86 The employee's speech rights are balanced against the
government's interests in maintaining an efficient workforce and the
integrity and efficacy of the administration of governmental services. This

rule turns out to be a fairly harsh one for government employees,
impacting their freedom to both engage in political discourse and to
participate in the political process. First, their political speech is only
protected when expressed as private citizens, unconnected to their official
roles or duties. 87 Thus, an investigator criticizing his department's

unlawful handling of an arrest8 8 or a prosecutor questioning how her
office performs and distributes work 89-both addressing critical concerns
over the operation of government-are not protected. Then, even when
employees express their grievances as private citizens, the government
may use that expression as one reason among others to retaliate against

& Payroll Summary Report: 2019, U.S. Census Bureau 1 (June 30, 2020), https://ww
w.census.gov/programs-surveys/apes.html [https://perma.cc/2GAD-BY28] (showing 19.7
million state and local government employees). This figure does not include the nearly 1.4
million members of the armed services, whose political speech is severely curtailed though
stands to offer some of the most pertinent and informed political expression. See, e.g., U.S.
Dep't of Def., Armed Forces Strength Figures for August 31, 2021, https://dwp.dmdc.osd.m
iI/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports [https://perma.cc/KR7X-LB7K]; Parker v.

Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 758 (1974) ("While the members of the military are not excluded from
the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military
community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections.").
86 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
146 (1983). This line of cases establishes a two-pronged test for determining whether
government employee speech is protected from regulation: prong one asks if the employee's

speech is spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern; prong two asks if there is adequate
justification for treating the employee differently from a member of the public. Garcetti v.

Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). Together, the two prongs place a thumb on the scale
against protecting government employees' speech, because whether the speech is a matter of
public concern depends on the "content, form, and context" of the statement, which itself is
inextricably linked with the speaker's position as a government employee. Connick, 461 U.S.

at 147-48.
87 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. This dynamic may or may not be governed by employment
contract, but the First Amendment determines whether such a contractual provision regulating

an employee's speech is permissible. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980)
(per curiam).
88 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414.
89 Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
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the employee through an adverse employment action.9 0 Most intrusive of
all, the First Amendment permits the government to severely restrict the
partisan activity of its employees, including their First Amendment rights

to participate in political campaigns, make or solicit political donations,
and run for office. 91 The reasons these restrictions survive First
Amendment scrutiny are rooted in the Court's understanding that
reasonable limits on government employee speech are necessary for
maintaining both a well-functioning government and a fair and noncoercive democratic process.
Similarly, public school students across the country are subject to
numerous restrictions on their political speech rights, both inside and
outside the schoolhouse gates, before and after the bell rings. Their speech
rights in school, in their communications with their peers, and in their
extra-curricular activities-together accounting for the vast majority of

students' time and expression-are evaluated under a highly deferential
reasonableness standard "in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment." 92 Their rights are not "coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings," but rather balanced against the sensibilities of
other students. 93 This includes political speech that school administrators
deem morally suspect or inappropriate, such as a school newspaper article
90

Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,285 (1977) (permitting government
animus towards an employee's political speech to be one but not the only cause of an adverse
employment action).

91 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 606 (1973) (upholding state law
prohibiting clearly partisan political activity, including campaigning or soliciting funds for
candidates and running for office); U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 550 (1973) (upholding federal statute prohibiting executive branch employees
from taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns" under the Hatch

Act); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 78, 93 (1947) (same); United States v.
Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 398 (1930) (upholding federal law prohibiting federal employees
from making contributions to any other federal official or candidate for "any political purpose
whatever"); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 371-72 (1882) (upholding statute prohibiting
certain federal employees from giving money to other employees for political purposes).
92
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (school speech regulations must only be
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns"); Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L.,
No. 20-255, slip op. at 1, 5 (S. Ct. June 23, 2021) (applying Tinker to a peer-to-peer
communication off campus and after school hours).
93 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-82 (1986). Whereas Tinker used
a "substantial disruption" or "material interference" test for restricting student speech, 393
U.S. at 514, Fraser held that school officials may reasonably determine "what manner of
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate" and restrict it accordingly,
478 U.S. at 683.

2022]

Equal Speech Protection

383

on sexual mores 94 or a quizzical banner reading "BONG HiTS 4

JESUS." 95 The standard is deferential enough that even prior restraints,
considered the most insidious form of censorship, regularly withstand
scrutiny. 96
This moderation of students' political speech rights is not simply a

function of their status as minors, for even adult students receive less
protection for their political speech within the educational environment.
Over eighty-five percent of public universities in the United States
enforce speech policies that restrict their students' political expression in

order to foster an effective and inclusive educational environment. 97
These policies include restrictions on speech that conveys bias,
discrimination, intimidation, hostility, bullying, aggression, vulgarity,
incivility, offensiveness, disrespect, and intolerance. 98 Though the
Supreme Court has not often interceded to define the speech rights of
students in a university setting, 99 it has signaled its approval of deferring

to school administrators here, too.1 00 It has also understood programs of
public universities to operate as limited public forums, which (as
discussed below) are a wide-ranging set of places wherein the government
may exercise increased control over speech in order to ensure expression

94

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.

9

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 408-10 (2007).

96 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 276 (holding school administrators may exercise prior restraint of
school-sponsored expression, such as curriculum-based student newspapers and assembly
speeches, if the censorship is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical interests).
97 Spotlight on Speech Codes 2021, FIRE, https://www.thefire.org/resources/spotlight/

reports/spotlight-on-speech-codes-2021 [https://perma.cc/25YF-5LA5] (last visited Oct. 10,
2021).
98 Id.
99 The Court has let stand severe restrictions on college students' political speech for
decades, including declining to stop the prolific use of "free speech zones" by universities
from the 1980s through the 2000s, which restrict students' political expression to narrow times
and places on campus. David L. Hudson & Andrew Gargano, Free-Speech Zones, First
Amendment Ctr., (Nov. 8, 2017) https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-

center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/free-speech-on-public-college-campuses-overview/free-s
peech-zones/ [https://perma.cc/BTX7-5MFC]. Though in decline and having fared poorly in
lower courts in recent years, about seven percent of universities still use them. FIRE, supra
note 97.

' Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 686 (2010) (reaffirming in a university
free speech case that "judges lack the on-the-ground expertise and experience of school
administrators," and cautioning courts against "substituting their own notions of sound

educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review," citing numerous
high school speech cases).
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is compatible with the purpose of the forum. 10 1 Lower courts, in turn,

employ a combination of deferential review standards in the university
context, from Tinker to limited public forum doctrine to qualified
immunity.10 2 The result is universities having sufficient flexibility to
tailor campus speech to their educational mission-to the overwhelming
approval of college students. 1 03
Faring worst of all are the constitutional speech rights of the more than
two million incarcerated individuals in our federal, state, and local
prisons. 10 4 Their political speech rights are systematically and sharply

curtailed, with little prospect of relief or accommodation. Speechrestrictive policies in prison are valid so long as they are "reasonably
101 See id. at 679 n.12 (understanding the university's Registered Student Organization
program to be a limited public forum); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995) (analyzing the university's Student Activities Fund program as a limited public
forum).
102 See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1282-83, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004)
(applying K-12 precedents to college student's First Amendment challenge to his removal

from a theater program); Univ. of S. Miss. Chapter of Miss. Civ. Liberties Union v. Univ. of
S. Miss., 452 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying Tinker's "disruption" standard to
university's denial of official recognition to civil rights organization); Abbott v. Pastides, 900
F.3d 160, 175 (4th Cir. 2018) (applying qualified immunity doctrine to shield university
administrators from First Amendment challenge); Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 531 (8th
Cir. 2016) (applying Kuhlmeier to student's dismissal from nursing program for unethical
Facebook posts); see also Frank D. Lo Monte, The Legislative Response to a Perceived "Free

Speech Crisis" on Campus, 34 Comm. Law. 7, 9-10 (2019) (discussing cases where lower
courts used the more deferential standard).
"0 See, e.g., Thompson Ctr. on Pub. Leadership, The First Amendment Under Stress: A

Survey of UW-Madison Students' Views on Free Speech and Religious Liberties, https://thom
psoncenter.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/509/202 1/01/Thompson-Center-First-Amend
ment-Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6KT-7VQ9] (finding that 63% of students think the
government should punish hate speech and more than 50% think the government should

restrict the speech of racially insensitive people); The William F. Buckley, Jr. Program at Yale,
Almost Half (49%) of U.S. College Students "Intimidated" by Professors When Sharing
Differing Beliefs: Survey, McLaughlin & Assocs. (Oct. 26, 2015), https://mclaughlinonline.co
m/2015/10/26/the-william-f-buckley-jr-program-at-yale-almost-half-49-of-u-s-college-stude
nts-intimidated-by-professors-when-sharing-differing-beliefs-survey/ [https://perma.cc/S87N
-X2R8] (finding that 72% of students "support disciplinary action for 'any racist, sexist,
homophobic and otherwise offensive"' speech; 72% of students desire further policies to
increase diversity of opinion on campus; and "[b]y a 51% to 36% margin, students favor their

school having speech codes to regulate speech for students and faculty); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky & Howard Gillman, Free Speech on Campus 10-15 (2017) (finding similar
patterns in student approval for speech policies on campus).
104 Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, Prison Pol'y

Initiative (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.
cc/Z6AG-5B32]. This figure includes the roughly 120,000 individuals in juvenile detention,
immigration detention, involuntary confinement, and territorial, Indian, and military prisons.
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related to legitimate penological interests"-essentially rational basis
review for political speech suppression.' 0 5 Indeed, the doctrine requires
something akin to rational basis-level deference to prison officials'
regulations of inmates' political speech, requiring "substantial evidence

in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response
to [penological] considerations," before second-guessing "their expert

judgment in such matters." 1 06 The rationale for this standard, here again,
is to advance the safe and orderly administration of a core governmental
function. The rule is harsh and all-encompassing: it boasts of no
exceptions,' 07 and since it was announced, it has produced an unbroken
line of cases validating every restriction on a prisoner's political speech
rights to come before the Court.1 08 Furthermore, judicial relief is not only
hard to win legally, but it is also arduous to access procedurally, as
prisoners are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before
seeking to vindicate their speech rights in court.1 09
The restrictions against prisoners' political speech are severe.
Incarcerated individuals have no rights to form or operate a union, meet

to organize political causes, 1 0 correspond with one another even to
provide legal assistance,"' speak with a journalist,' 2 associate with other
105 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Lab. Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) ("In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First
Amendment rights that are inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

106 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
107 At one point, prisoners' mail received higher protection because mail restrictions

impinge on the non-prisoner correspondent's First Amendment rights, see Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974), but the Supreme Court later rejected "any attempt to

forge separate standards for cases implicating the [First Amendment] rights of outsiders [and
inmates]." Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 410 n.9, 411 (1989). Federal circuit courts
have extended greater protection to prisoners' incoming legal mail, though they recognize that
the First Amendment alone does not bestow this heightened protection. Aaron C. Lapin, Are
Prisoners' Rights to Legal Mail Lost Within the Prison Gates?, 33 Nova L. Rev. 703, 716-

727 (2009) (discussing circuit disagreements and various underlying rights to legal mail);
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 408 (1996) (holding that right to legal materials in prison
derives from right of access to the courts).
08 David M. Shapiro, Lenient in Theory, Dumb in Fact: Prison, Speech, and Scrutiny, 84

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 972, 983 (2016).

109

42 U.S.C.

§

1997e(a) (2018) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions . . .by a prisoner . .. until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.").
" 0 Jones, 433 U.S. at 131-33.
" Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001).
.12 Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
827-28 (1974); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978).
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citizens in noncontact visits,113 or access books, newspapers, magazines,
and photographs.11 4 Book bans in particular are a rampant and weighty
impingement on inmates' political speech rights as they deny access to

the information necessary to the formation of political dialogue and
opinion.1 5 Books such as The New Jim Crow, Just Mercy, and those
authored by President Obama are among the thousands of banned pieces
of literature in prison"'--despite numerous studies showing that access
to such reading and education in prison reduces violence and rates of
recidivism." 7 But whether such regulations are defensible policy-wise is

a different question from whether the Court should strike them down. And
even where the Court should overturn them, the point stands that it does
not-prisoner political speech goes largely unprotected by the judiciary,

as does much of the political speech of the millions of other institutional
speakers.
Lastly, while occupying powerful political positions in society, the
political speech rights of the owners and operators of electronic media are
commonly regulated to ensure a robust and diverse media speech
environment. In this area, the government has substantial leeway to adopt
structural regulations that impact media providers' content-including
their political content-in order to foster viewpoint diversity, localism,
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131-36 (2003).
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 524-25 (2006).
115 As Michelle Alexander, author of The New Jim Crow, has stated: "Some prison officials
are determined to keep the people they lock in cages as ignorant as possible about the racial,
social and political forces that have made the United States the most punitive nation on
113

1"4

earth..

.

. Perhaps they worry the truth might actually set the captives free." Jonah E.

Bromwich, Why Are American Prisons So Afraid of This Book?, N.Y. Times (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/us/new-jim-crow-book-ban-prison.html

[https://perma

.cc/3478-GRG5].
116 PEN America, Literature Locked Up: How Prison Book Restriction Policies Constitute
the Nation's Largest Book Ban 3-6 (2019); Athina Hinson-Boyte, Book Bans: First
Amendment Violation of Prisoners, First Amend. L. Rev. Blog (2020), https://firstam
endmentlawreview.org/2020/03/31/book-bans-first-amendment-violation-of-prisoners/

[https

://perma.cc/VT48-UZNB]; Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2012)
(upholding ban on receiving a copy of The Physician's Desk Reference for an inmate to

educate himself on his medication).
117 See, e.g., Michelle Fine et al., Changing Minds: The Impact of College in a MaximumSecurity Prison 16, 21 (2001); Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Education from the Inside, Out: The
Multiple Benefits of College Programs in Prison 5-9 (2009); Laura Winterfield, Mark
Coggeshall, Michelle Burke-Storer, Vanessa Correa & Simon Tidd, The Effects of
Postsecondary Correctional Education 12-13 (2009); Lois M. Davis, Robert Bozick, Jennifer
L. Steele, Jessica Saunders & Jeremy N. V. Miles, Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Correctional Education 57-58 (2013).
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and the free flow of information. 11 8 In other words, the government has
some authority to redistribute political speech power when it comes to
information and communication service providers. 11 9 Ownership caps,

content obligations, and access rules are common throughout all of media
regulation, pervading the Communications Acts of 1934 and 1996.120
These regulations directly influence the content and breadth of media
entities' political speech by requiring, at various points, that they present
fair and balanced discussion of political issues,1 21 grant candidates an
equal right of access to their airwaves,1 2 2 carry other entities' political
content, 123 refrain from politically discriminating against persons or

localities, 24 and maintain diverse ownership to prevent capture of the
information markets.' 2 ' Though such regulations might appear to affect a

relatively small number of wealthy and powerful individuals, their impact
is actually near-universal. Americans now engage in and receive most of
118 Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition: How the Free Speech Curriculum Ignores
Electronic Media and Distorts Free Speech Doctrine, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 59, 65 (2005); see also
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure

of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 365 (1999) (arguing that the line of cases from
Associated Press v. United States through Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC "have adopted,
in large part, the view that a concentrated information environment menaces First Amendment
values").
19 This group of entities encompasses the range of information, media, and communication
service providers that transmit content by wire, radio, broadcast, cable, and Internet.

120 See Dana A. Scherer, Cong. Rsch. Serv., The FCC's Rules and Policies Regarding Media
Ownership, Attribution, and Ownership Diversity (2016) (explaining that the Federal
Communications Commission's policies seek to encourage diversity, localism, and
competition in broadcasting and that recent trends in consumption are contributing to debate
in Congress as to whether common ownership of multiple media outlets in the same market
might limit diversity of viewpoints as much today as in the past).
12' Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (upholding the "fairness
doctrine," requiring radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion
of public issues on the airwaves). In Red Lion, the Supreme Court placed the political speech
interests of viewers above those of broadcasters, subjecting the latter to content-based speech
regulations if reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. Id. at 390.

122 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2018); 47 CFR § 76.205(a) (2020); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367,
378-79 (1981).
123 Turner Broad. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 626-27, 661-62 (1994) (holding the requirement
that cable operators carry local broadcast channels to be a content-neutral restriction on speech
subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); Turner Broad. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185
(1997) (holding the "must-carry" provisions consistent with the First Amendment under
intermediate scrutiny).
124 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2018).
125

FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 779 (1978) (upholding

ownership regulations over newspapers and broadcasters because the rule enhances the

diversity of information in society).
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their political expression through phone, television, and the Internet, as

opposed to in person or through print mediums. They discuss, petition,
consume the news, organize, and solicit through these electronic
technologies far more than through leaflets, newspapers, street-corner
speech, and demonstrations. 126 Media regulations, therefore, have a
profound effect on the terms by which ordinary citizens consume and
participate in political discourse.
3. PoliticalConduct

An inordinate amount of our political expression comes in the form of
conduct as opposed to speech, in the conventional sense of that word.
When it does, it receives moderate or even no First Amendment
protection. From private business and consumer choices reflecting our
political views to public acts undertaken for political purposes, our
conduct is integral to and often the sole medium of our political
expression. Yet a good deal of that conduct unremarkably garners no First
Amendment protection, and the rest is again subject to reasonable
restrictions to advance important public interests in a safe, orderly, and
vibrant public sphere.

First, there are certain conventionally regulated types of conductincluding traditional criminal offenses and contract and business
activity-that

garner no First Amendment

protection even when

undertaken as an overtly political act. For example, vandalizing a
Confederate statute, occupying a government building, and biasmotivated assaults12 7 obviously claim no protection. Likewise, the First
Amendment is no barrier to government enforcement of antitrust and
contract laws against political publications and organizations, or of
business and zoning ordinances against political shops and institutes.1 28

Similarly, where a government regulation inhibits a consumer's ability to
126

Marvin Ammori, Challenging the Constitutional Framework for Media Regulation,

Marvin Ammori & Friends on Tech. Pol'y (Dec. 23, 2009), https://ammori.org/2009/
12/23/threatening-the-constitutional-framework-for-media-regulation/

[https://perma.cc/8NE

T-BWMX].
12 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 479, 490 (1993) (upholding enhanced
sentencing law for bias-motivated crimes).
128 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (upholding
antitrust enforcement against a newspaper for restraint of trade under the Sherman Act); Cohen

v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (holding the First Amendment does not bar
contract suit against the press for breaching a promise of confidentiality to a source); Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding law banning residential picketing).
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purchase a product or frequent a business for political purposes, the First
Amendment offers no protection. 129
Expressive conduct that falls outside these traditionally unprotected
categories is also subject to frequent, routine government regulation.

Because such speech occurs through conduct and conduct has
innumerable incidental externalities on the safety, welfare, and order of
society, the Supreme Court has fashioned a flexible and moderate level of
protection for expressive conduct: the government may restrict it to
further an important public interest that is unrelated to the suppression of
expression if the restriction does not burden substantially more speech
than necessary to fulfill this interest.' 30 Here again, the Court is clear that
judicial deference to the government's judgment about the appropriate

calibration of speech rights with other governmental interests is wise and
proper.' 3

Under this standard of protection, known as the O'Brien standard,
regulations that aim at nothing more than suppressing the message of the
conduct at issue-such as anti-flag-burning statutes-are unlawful;

2

but

regulations that reasonably advance a legitimate governmental interest are
valid even if they significantly and directly impinge on political speech
rights. 3 3 It is under this rule that the government may still prohibit

129 Take, for example, a buyer who seeks to purchase a renewable energy lamp because they
decide to go green: a political choice. Imagine that the store does not have the lamp in stock
because a newly implemented government import tax caused delays in the company's

distribution. The buyer's ability to exercise political conduct was impeded by their inability
to purchase the lamp, but they do not have a First Amendment claim against the government.
130 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491

U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
131 Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 798 ("We do not believe ...
that either United States
v. O'Brien or the time, place, or manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to
replace the [parks department] as the manager of the [city's] parks or endow the judiciary with
the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of
conservation is to be attained." (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S.

288, 299 (1984))).
32 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310, 315-18 (1990) (holding flag-desecration statutes unconstitutional even when cabined to
non-communicative desecration because such regulations still relate to suppressing disrespect

for the flag); Spence v. Washington, 418 US 405, 405-06 (1974) (per curiam) (overturning
application of a law against displaying a U.S. flag affixed with any symbol to a protester who

hung his flag with a peace sign taped onto it).
133 See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 798 (reaffirming that regulations of expressive
conduct "need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means" of advancing the
government's interests).
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burning a draft card to protest the draft,' 34 sleeping in a public park to
raise awareness about the plight of the homeless, 35 burning a cross to
reject racial integration, 136 and damaging military documents to protest
nuclear proliferation.1 3 7

The rules governing the protection of expressive conduct are a case
study in how the expansion of First Amendment coverage to more and

more types of speech-here, to the "expression of an idea through
activity"1 38-has an equalizing impact on the level of protection that
speech receives, in contravention of a hierarchical model of speech
protection. Scholars have warned that collapsing speech and conduct will

indeed create pressure to level down the protection for political speech.1 39
Their concern, however, has been that expanding coverage to nonpolitical conduct will water down protection for political expression.
Their prediction is likely correct, but its premises are flawed. It was the
expansion of First Amendment protection to politicalconduct in O'Brien
that has moderated protection for much political expression
communicated through activity. Furthermore, the warning assumes that

First Amendment protection for political speech is (and perhaps should
be) higher than protection for non-political speech. But as this Article
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
Clark, 468 U.S. at 289.
136 Cross burning occupies a sui generis position in expressive conduct doctrine. The
Supreme Court has charted a middle ground for this uniquely potent and historically fraught
example of political expression: cross burning solely to communicate messages of shared
1
"I

group identity and ideology are protected, but cross burning for any other impermissible

motive, such as to threaten or intimidate, is proscribable. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,
(2003). Critics of this compromise rightly question whether a burning cross can ever
communicate a message of intimidation and therefore fall outside the scope of protection.
id. at 388-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The practical effect of this compromise, therefore,

363
not
See
is it

imposes a drafting requirement on cross burning legislation rather than actually protecting a

hypothetical swath of "purely political" cross burnings.
13 United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 677, 686-89 (1985).
138 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam).

139 Mark Tushnet, The Coverage/Protection Distinction in the Law of Freedom of SpeechAn Essay on Meta-Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 25 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1073, 111416 (2017) (arguing that one level of protection for all speech might force the Court to level all
protection for speech downwards); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment:
A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265, 271-72 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories
and the First Amendment] (warning that if truly all activity involving speech is protected, then
"[w]e must either water down the test for protection ... or conclude that certain categories of
speech are to be tested under drastically different standards of protection"); Frederick Schauer,
On the Distinction Between Speech and Action, 65 Emory L.J. 427, 427 (2015) (questioning
whether "the First Amendment's necessary distinction between speech and action [is]

fundamentally unsustainable").
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makes clear, protection amongst types of speech is (and perhaps should

be) largely equal.
4. PoliticalSpeech on Public Property
This same level of moderate protection that gives the government

ample discretion to regulate political conduct also applies to political
speech uttered on public property.14 0 Public property is of course

pervasive, from streets and sidewalks to plazas and parks. These are the
most prominent physical places where political speech naturally and
traditionally occurs, and are often the only feasible places for many of the

most potent forms of political speech, such as rallies, protests, marches,
proselytizing, and leafletting. Yet the First Amendment permits ample,

direct regulation of political speech in these spaces and makes no
distinction between types of speech. 14 1 The Supreme Court has long held
that the right "to use the streets and parks for communication of views on

national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute,
but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order." 142
The government has at least four levers for controlling political speech
on public property to ensure it comports with public order and the safe

and effective exchange of ideas. It may directly regulate the time, place,
and manner of the speech itself; re-designate the property into a limited
or nonpublic forum where the government has more leeway to moderate
or ban speech altogether; regulate the secondary harmful effects of
political speech; and use its own speech to exclude or amplify messages
in these forums.
Turning first to time, place, and manner regulations, the government

has broad discretion to regulate the scope, volume, duration, location,
mode, and method of speech on public property so long as the regulation

is content-neutral, meaning it does not discriminate between different
140 Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 (clarifying that the O'Brien standard for regulating expressive
conduct "is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner
restrictions" on government property).

141 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 543, 54854 (2009) (describing extensive government interference and elimination of public dissent on

government property); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Our Shrinking First Amendment: On the

Growing Problem of Reduced Access to Public Property for Speech Activity and Some
Suggestions for a Better Way Forward, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 779, 801-03 (2017) (documenting the
wide latitude government has in restricting speech on public property).

142 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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types of speech. The requirement of content-neutrality is a primary

example, discussed further below, of how foundational First Amendment
doctrine actually works to equalize protection among different types of

speech, in contravention of the invented hierarchy model of speech
protection. In public forums, the time, place, and manner of political
speech is as regulable as that of commercial, artistic, or even nonsensical
speech. These regulations are widely permissible, having only to be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. Under this
standard the government may, for example, prohibit individuals from
approaching others to engage in political expression outside an abortion

clinic,143 ban picketing in residential neighborhoods, 144 or require a
performer to use government equipment and technicians to play her
message.'1 4 The "significant interests" undergirding these permissible

restrictions all relate to ensuring the safe, orderly, and healthy exchange
of political information. As such, political speech on public property
receives the same moderate protection as other political speech-a level
of protection that permits reasonable speech regulations on public

property even when they apply only to certain speakers or have a
14 6
disproportionate effect on certain topics, viewpoints, and speakers.

Second, on other public land of the government's own choosing, the
state may impose more direct and more targeted restrictions on political
(and all other) speech to ensure the property conforms with the
government's intended use for it. Courts have divided public property into
essentially three categories, each with its own tolerance for speech
regulation: traditional public forums are "places which, by long tradition
or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate;" limited
or designated public forums are "public property which the State has
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity[;]" and
nonpublic forums are "[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or
143 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707-08, 712-14 (2000) (upholding a law against
approaching another person within 100 feet of an abortion clinic to pass "a leaflet or handbill
to, displa[y] a sign to, or engag[e] in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person"
as a content-neutral place and manner regulation); see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna

Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-55 (1981) (allowing ban on non-stationary solicitation and
distribution of written materials at state fair as a permissible place and manner regulation).

' Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988).
145 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784, 803 (1989) (upholding city
requirement that performers use city sound equipment and technicians as a valid manner
restriction).

146 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 479-83 (2014); see also United States v. Kistner,
68 F.3d 218, 219, 221 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding free speech zones at the St. Louis Arch).
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designation a forum for public communication."'44 In a traditional public
forum, the government may regulate the time, place, and manner of

speech under the standards just discussed; the same is true for speech in a
limited public forum, except the government may also exclude speech that
is incompatible with the purpose of the forum. Finally, in a nonpublic
forum, the government may subject speech to any "reasonable" regulation
so long as the restriction is "not an effort to suppress expression merely

because public officials oppose the speaker's view." 1 4 8
As these definitions make clear, it is the government itself that
primarily controls how public property is designated and thus the extent
of its own authority over speech on that property. The government

determines the purpose for opening a limited public forum and may
restrict speech or speakers incompatible with that purpose; it may also
close the forum entirely at its discretion. 4 9 It may ensure, for example,
that student spaces are only open to student speech, that museums are

dedicated to only certain types of art, and that children's programming is
restricted to child-appropriate content. 5 0 The government may also
determine that its land is not a forum for public expression at all. For

example, the government may prohibit political expression in the public
spaces surrounding its buildings by dedicating that space to individuals
engaged in government business, by enacting a regulation against

disruptive behavior there, or even by declining to explicitly dedicate that
space to expression.1 5 1 Courts broadly defer to government decisions to
label public lands as nonpublic forums, including such sites as parks,

1? Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Loc. Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
Admittedly, public forum doctrine is less than clear, and lower courts have recognized a
conflicting number of sub-categories of forums within the doctrine. See Aaron H. Caplan,

Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 Willamette L. Rev. 647, 647, 654 (2010)
(describing public forum doctrine as a "kudzu," wherein "there is not even agreement as to
how many levels of forum exist within the public forum doctrine").
148 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.

See id. at 45-46, 46 n.7.
" 0Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68, 267 n.5 (1981) (university meeting spaces
1

may be limited to student groups); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp't Rels.

Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 169, 172-77 (1976) (school board meeting may be limited to board
business).
'm1 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727-30 (1990) (plurality opinion) (upholding
ban on political solicitation on sidewalk outside post office because the government had

constructed the space to allow patrons to enter the post office and had not expressly dedicated

the space to expression).
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plazas, and memorials.' 5 2 Thus, speakers wishing to engage in political

speech on public land are largely limited to property the government
approves for that type of speech.

Third, the government has substantial leeway to address the unsafe or
disorderly secondary effects of speech, even where such regulations
burden the speech right itself.153 Courts consider regulations aimed at the
secondary effects of speech as content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions even if the law facially discriminates against certain types of

speech or speakers. 5 4 The secondary effects doctrine has thus far been
used to restrict sexually explicit speech, but the Court has implied that the
doctrine applies equally to political speech as it does to any other type of

speech."' The secondary effects of congestion, noise, blight, or litter that
attend permanent political installations like political encampments or the
clustering of many political organizations headquartered in a residential
area may well permit the government to explicitly limit such political
speech, and only that speech, under the lenient time, place, and manner
standard.
Finally, the government may uninhibitedly use its own speech to
exclude messages from public forums by deciding which messages to
promote using its resources. Very often, citizens will seek government
152 See Krotoszynski, supra note 141, at 781 n.i, 801; see also Lee v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992) (per curiam) (holding airport terminal is a nonpublic
forum wherein the government may ban all solicitation as a reasonable restriction on speech);
Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1158-61 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009
(2016) (holding Supreme Court plaza is a nonpublic forum); Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d
545, 552-54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the Jefferson Memorial is a nonpublic forum).
1 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986) (permitting a city to zone out
adult movie theaters because of the deleterious effects these establishments tend to have on
their neighborhoods); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438-39
(2002) (plurality opinion) (upholding a ban on more than one adult entertainment business in
the same building on the basis of a study that a concentration of such businesses is associated
with an increase in crime).
154 City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46.

I See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 n.7 (1992) (analyzing whether the

emotive effects of political speech are secondary effects, subject to time, place, and manner

restrictions); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988) (plurality opinion) (analyzing
whether a regulation prohibiting the display of certain political signs near embassies targets
the secondary effects of that political speech); id. at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring) (criticizing
the majority's secondary effects analysis for applying that doctrine to political speech).
Neither Renton nor Alameda Books upheld the challenged regulations under the secondary

effects doctrine by relying on the fact that the speech at issue was sexually explicit speech,
and both cite cases involving other types of speech. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52;
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 430.
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assistance in expressing their political messages in public spaces, such as
by asking the government to exhibit a political art show, place a
monument in a park, or print a license plate with a political message on
it. It is fully within the government's discretion to accept or deny these

requests based on whether it agrees with the message seeking to be
conveyed. 156 This level of power over public messaging has an immense
influence over public discourse-and indeed has enabled propaganda
campaigns and speech-control programs throughout U.S. history. 157 It is

nonetheless compatible with the First Amendment's embrace of equal and
moderate protection for speech as an important tool for directly fostering

a more robust, vibrant, and equal democratic discourse.
5. PoliticalSpeech on PrivateProperty
Where the First Amendment permits ample regulation of political
speech on public property, it accepts near limitless interference with
political speech on private property.1 58 This is because the First

Amendment, like most constitutional provisions, only applies to
government conduct, and thus is no barrier to private restrictions of
speech on private property. The consequences of this rule for free
speech-and especially for the right to engage in political speech-have

always been weighty, as most adult speech surely occurs within the
private premises of our homes, worksites, and the businesses we frequent.

It has taken on an entirely unprecedented dimension, however, in the
context of the Internet and the rise of social media on private platforms.
Yet notwithstanding that such virtual forums essentially operate as the

modern public square,1 59 the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to

15 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472-73, 481 (2009) (holding the
government may determine what group's monuments are placed in a public park because that
choice is a form of government speech); Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans,

Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 216 (2015) (holding that the approval or rejection of license plate design
applications is government speech).

17 Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 117 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 551-53 (2018).
1 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (holding that picketers did not have

a First Amendment right to enter a shopping center with the purpose of advertising their

strike); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-70 (1972).
1 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (identifying "cyberspacethe vast democratic forums of the Internet ... and social media in particular" as "the most
important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted)).
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extend the First Amendment to private forums.1 60 As a result, prominent
and important political speech that contributes immensely to our national
political discourse is fully unprotected by our supposedly robust
constitutional free speech doctrine and is open to all manner of private
restriction, removal, and retaliation. Kneeling during the national anthem
at a sports game, wearing a "Black Lives Matter" shirt to work, or
attempting to unionize a private shop all garner no First Amendment
protection from private censorship. Neither does a political post on

Facebook or the organization of a political movement on Twitter. Not
even the President's speech is immune from being altered, deleted, or
banned from such platforms.
In these privately owned and operated spaces, both virtual and
physical, the absence of First Amendment protection is the great equalizer
of speech protection. All speech, from commercial to political to the
inane, is equally unprotected from private suppression, interference, and
manipulation. In these prolific spaces, the supposed boast that our free
speech jurisprudence vigorously protects all political speech does not just

come up short; it does not make it past go. At the same time, as with other
political speech, the absence of First Amendment protection opens up

more room for the government to impose affirmative obligations on
private entities to foster a safe and healthy democratic discourse on their
property.
6. PoliticalSpeech Categorically Unprotected
Another category of political speech that receives no First Amendment

protection is political "speech crimes." These are crimes that do not
simply involve speech but whose criminal element consists entirely of
speech. Such crimes can be roughly divided into three categories: verbal
mistreatment, such as threats, cyberbullying, and harassment;'61
16 0Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) ("[T]his Court's
longstanding precedents[] establish that the Free Speech Clause prohibits only governmental
abridgment of speech.. . . [It] does not prohibit private abridgment of speech.").
161 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (declining to review Title VII's
prohibition on verbal harassment that creates a hostile work environment under the First

Amendment); Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (defining
prohibitable harassment in the educational context as speech that is "so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity

or benefit"); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-60 (2003) (defining threats outside the
scope of First Amendment protection as statements made "with the intent of placing the victim

in fear of bodily harm or death").
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malicious falsehoods, including fraud, perjury, hoaxing, and other
harmful lies; 162 and coordinated speech intended to harm a third party,
and
incitement,
agreements,
anticompetitive
like
conspiracy,
espionage.1 63 Such crimes, even when perpetrated for purely political
purposes, are not balanced against any First Amendment values at
stake.1 64 In fact, the First Amendment does not apply at all. 165
These crimes stand to sweep in a not insignificant amount of obviously
political speech. For example, refusing to file taxes to protest a war,

declining to testify at the trial of a political dissident, verbally haranguing
a racist coworker, conspiring to obstruct traffic for a political
demonstration, inciting a crowd to riot over a stolen election, and
disclosing classified information about a surveillance program to the
press are all unprotected criminal speech. Speech crimes demonstrate how

particularly harmful political speech is fully and routinely prohibited by
law. They also show how zeroing out protection for such speechpolitical and otherwise-serves once more to equalize the level of
protection (or lack thereof) for political speech and other speech.
162 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.

§ 1001 (criminalizing knowing and willful materially false

statements in any government matter); Model Penal Code § 250.3 (Am. L. Inst. 1980)
(criminalizing false reports of crimes or catastrophes that cause "public inconvenience or

alarm"); Louis W. Tompros, Richard A. Crudo, Alexis Pfeiffer & Rahel Boghossian, The
Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social Networking Sites in a PostAlvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 65, 82-84 (discussing false
reporting statutes).

163 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (holding that the
First Amendment does not protect speech or press activity from antitrust laws); Dennis v.

United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (holding that conspiracies to overthrow the
government are constitutionally prohibitable); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49
(1969) (per curiam) (allowing states to forbid advocacy of the use of force where it is directed
to inciting and likely to produce that force); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.

886, 915, 927-28 (1982) (finding no liability for a civil rights organizer who made
impassioned speeches, but noting that the analysis would be different if those speeches were
likely to incite lawless action); FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 425-28
(1990) (finding that the First Amendment did not protect a boycott with the objective of
gaining economic advantage for those participating); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d
583, 591-92 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that the communication of secret information to a foreign
government is not protected under the First Amendment).
1" For the argument that courts should balance First Amendment values against public
harms in whistleblower cases, see Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for

National Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 281, 285-86, 306
(2014).

165

The definition and scope of these crimes is subject to First Amendment scrutiny, as all

crimes are. But speech that falls within their definitions is entirely unprotected, regardless of
its political nature.
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Understanding the broad range of permissible speech crimes, including
speech that touches on matters of public concern, properly situates the
few contrary cases as both narrow and marginal. In particular, United
States v. Alvarez, Snyder v. Phelps, and Brandenburg v. Ohio166 -all

touted as foundational cases that confirm expansive protection for
dangerous and malicious speech-are anything but. These cases,
respectively, appear to provide expansive protection for false statements,

emotionally disturbing speech, and incitement. Yet each is riddled with
loopholes and exceptions, such that they ultimately only protect a narrow
band of deleterious speech-that is, falsehoods with no injurious
impact;167

nondisruptive

vile

speech

spoken

on

public

property

concerning matters of public import; 168 and general advocacy of lawless
action that is neither intended nor likely to cause imminent harm.1 69 As
such, they do little to protect analogous speech that is both more
treacherous and more naturally employed to accomplish harmful ends,
like lies of consequence, harassment, and conspiracy to commit violence.
These cases are thus uninfluential in moving the doctrine away from
allowing the criminalization of speech that is but a hairsbreadth different
from the speech protected in these cases, and that is the more common
and precarious form of deceiving, inflicting distress, and provoking
violence. In other words, these cases do not prevent the government from
restricting speech that seriously threatens public harm and endangers the
orderly and informed exchange of political discourse.
The underlying rationale for denying First Amendment protection to

speech crimes shines one of the brightest lights on the doctrinal instability
of the notion that political speech garners strict protection. Speech crimes

receive no constitutional protection because of a long-standing and
uncontroversial calculus that such speech is anathema to civilized society.
Though the Supreme Court has recently based the exclusion of such
speech on a "long-settled tradition of subjecting that speech to
regulation,"17 0 the significant evolution of the First Amendment's

166 567 U.S. 709 (2012); 562 U.S. 443 (2011); 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718-21, 725-26.
168 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453-58.
169 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49.
170 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010); see also Brown v. Ent. Merchs.
Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) (limiting speech excluded from the First Amendment to those
categories that are "part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription").
167
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application to speech crimes belies this simple explanation. 171 For

example, the scope of prohibitable incitement and false statements has
shifted dramatically since the post-New Deal speech revolution,
complicating any notion of a "long-settled tradition" in this area. 172 A
tradition of sanctioning speech crimes, therefore, cannot alone explain

their constitutional status. Rather, speech crimes lay beyond the bounds
of First Amendment protection not only by tradition, but also by

continuing acceptance that such speech is incompatible with an ordered
democratic society. Despite the Court's platitudes that the First
Amendment prevents suppression of socially objectionable speech,' 73 the
doctrine permits exactly this. Acknowledging that value judgments do

animate aspects of the doctrine in turn undercuts one of the central tenets
underlying strict protection for political speech: that the government may
not restrict speech based on a judgment as to the value of that speech. In

fact, the doctrine is laden with value judgments, which makes that
principle a shaky pillar on which to rest absolute protection for political
speech.
7. PoliticalSpeech and NationalSecurity Exceptionalism
Finally, protection for political speech is especially relaxed in the
context of protecting U.S. foreign and domestic security. Beginning with

political speech that threatens foreign national security interests, the
government has ample authority to restrict, ban, and punish political
speech that is likely to cause national security harm-and receives
substantial deference in determining the likelihood of whether such harm
will occur. Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project is exemplary.17 4 There,
the Court upheld a restriction on providing nonviolent dispute resolution

training to a designated terrorist organization. 7 5 The Court did not
independently assess the likelihood that such support would harm
171

See generally Lakier, supra note 2 (documenting the evolving protection standards for

low-value speech).
712 Id. at 2168, 2197-99.
173 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea

simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995) ("[T]he point of all speech
protection . . . is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided,
or even hurtful.").
174 561 U.S. 1, 7-15 (2010).

175 Id. at 7-10, 36-39.
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national security interests; it instead deferred to executive and
congressional "empirical" findings that any form of support to terrorist
organizations poses a serious threat of furthering terrorist activity.

16

The

Court explained that "when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing
factual inferences in this area, the lack of competence on the part of the
courts is marked ... and respect for the Government's conclusions is
appropriate."'1

77

How much respect is appropriate? The Court found it

"vital in this context not to substitute .. . [its] own evaluation . .. for a
reasonable evaluation" by the government as to the necessity of banning
speech to prevent national security harm.1 78 Once again, the government's

reasonable assessments as to the potential harm of political speech are
controlling.
The government's power and latitude to restrict speech to protect
against foreign security threats is pervasive, wide-ranging, and severe. It

has consistently been employed, in a mostly unchecked fashion, to limit
speech in reaction to every serious national security threat since the
Founding.

79

It has justified sweeping restrictions on communications,

relations, and associations between citizens and foreign nationals,
including information-sharing bans, travel bans, bans on accessing or
distributing foreign literature, and bans on accepting foreign campaign
contributions.' 80 The government's power here is not just expansive; it is

176 Id. at 29, 32-34.
Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
178 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (concluding courts owe greater deference to government during
wartime); see also David Cole, The First Amendment's Borders: The Place of Holder v.
HumanitarianLaw Projectin First Amendment Doctrine, 6 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 147, 158

(2012) (describing Holder's relatively low level of protection for speech implicating national
security concerns).

179 See generally Stone, Perilous Times, supra note 52 (documenting an unbroken history of

government responding to foreign threats by cracking down on free speech, with near total
acquiescence by the Supreme Court).
180 Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More

Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 941, 942-43, 949-69 (2011) (describing the lack
of any meaningful protection for cross-border First Amendment rights, including only a

limited right to receive and distribute foreign materials, to host foreign speakers, to travel
abroad for the purpose of gathering information about foreign cultures, to send
communications to audiences abroad consisting solely of aliens, to associate with aliens
located abroad, to access and distribute materials disseminated by a foreign government, to
communicate with foreign regimes and agents without government authorization, and to freely

share certain scientific and technical information with aliens working in the United States).

.'
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exacting. It permits steep prison terms for engaging in such speech,' 8
allows for preventive restrictions on speech in response to potential

threats, 8 2 and more regularly enables prior restraints.' 83 Again, whether
or not Congress and the Executive have erred as a policy matter in limiting
political speech in response to national security threats, the Court has
applied only moderate scrutiny to these decisions, leaving them in place
where the government offers reasonable justifications for restricting

speech to protect public safety and the preservation of democracy, both
here and abroad.
Political speech fares little better in the context of maintaining
domestic security. Threats to internal peace and stability regularly justify
significant restrictions on expressive freedoms, including political
speech. For example, the Supreme Court has taken a far more lenient
stance on restrictions to union-organized labor protests in light of the

domestic security implications of widespread, organized labor discord
and disruption.'84 It has also permitted far greater restrictions on speech
18 For example, the Department of Justice has secured lengthy prison terms for individuals
who used social media to disseminate information, pledge support, or provide encouragement
to foreign terrorist organizations. See, e.g., United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41-42, 69

(1st Cir. 2013) (affirming a 210-month sentence for convictions of conspiracy to provide
material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill persons in a foreign country, and for translating

al-Qa'ida propaganda into English); Al Bahlul v. United States, 967 F.3d 858, 863-64, 877
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (affirming conviction of conspiracy to commit war crimes for production of
a propaganda video and remanding to review the imposed life-sentence under harmless error

standard); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 110-11, 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming
a 180-month sentence for one defendant's convictions of conspiracy to provide material
support to terrorists and related crimes, for which social media profiles, posts, and videos were

used as evidence).
82 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (assuming constitutionality of 2 U.S.C.

§ 441e,

the contribution and expenditure ban on "foreign national[s]," without discussing the
necessity of the ban for preventing foreign influence in U.S. elections).

'83 See, e.g., Twitter, Inc. v. Barr, 445 F. Supp. 3d 295, 298-99, 302-03, 305 (N.D. Cal.
2020) (upholding prior restraint on Twitter publishing a report on the number of foreign
intelligence surveillance orders it received); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon

Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 730-33, 740, 742-43 (1971) (indicating, in seriatim opinions signed
on to by a majority of the Justices, that a statute banning the publication of the type of report

at issue would be constitutional); id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he First
Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may be overridden .... only when the Nation 'is
at war."'); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931) ("No one would question but that a
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the
sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.").

184 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226-27 (1982) (upholding
ban on secondary boycotting); NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980)
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in the context of immigration enforcement, including permitting the
government to base deportation decisions on an alien's statements or
associations.'185 Similarly, it has insulated law enforcement decisions from
First Amendment challenge by imposing stringent pleading requirements
on cases alleging police retaliation for speech 18 6 and by maintaining a

robust qualified immunity doctrine that protects all manner of speechsuppressive police conduct. 187 By shielding law enforcement decisions
from First Amendment scrutiny, the Court has in effect weighed the risk
to public safety from law enforcement inaction against the risk to speech
from law enforcement action and determined that, where there is even a
sliver of doubt, domestic tranquility outweighs the freedom of speech.
This standard ultimately subordinates speech to the stable and efficient
protection of domestic security.

The dominant framework of political speech protection embraces
moderation by routinely subjecting the vast majority of political speech
to reasonable regulations aimed at ensuring a well-functioning democratic
government. It comprises various lenient protection standards that afford
significant discretion to the government to identify and respond to

specific speech harms across all types of political speech. This account
directly contradicts the mythologized narrative that the First Amendment
grants near-absolutist protection to political speech. It shows that political

speech protection is actually quite moderate, is equal to the protection

(same). See generally Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of
Limited Expression, 43 Md. L. Rev. 4 (1984) (discussing the Court's balancing of the
government's interest in economic regulation against workers' and unions' rights of speech

and association).
' 85 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 474, 488, 491-92 (1999)
(holding a person may not challenge deportation on grounds they were selectively prosecuted
for their speech); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to deportation); see also Zick, supra note 180, at 975.
186 Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254, 265-66 (2006) (requiring plaintiffs plead the
absence of probable cause for an investigation challenged on First Amendment retaliation
grounds); Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722-23 (2019) (same as applied to an arrest).
187 See, e.g., Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 660, 670 (2012) (holding Secret Service
officers were entitled to qualified immunity for a retaliatory arrest); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S.
744, 764, 747-48 (2014) (finding Secret Service officers who moved protestors away from
the President were entitled to qualified immunity from First Amendment violations); Bianchi
v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 318-19 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that absolute prosecutorial
immunity and qualified immunity barred all claims against a state's attorney for bringing a

political retaliatory prosecution).
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enjoyed by other speech in the same context, and permits ample
government discretion to regulate for speech that harms. This account

suggests that one reason the hierarchy myth has escaped notice is because
the bulk of political speech regulations are quite uncontroversial. In short,
they make sense. The idea of moderate protection for political speech,
therefore, is not just conventional; it is constructive.
C. Bottom-Up Equalization:Elevated Protectionfor
Non-PoliticalSpeech

At the same time that the Court has maintained a moderate level of
protection for political speech, it has worked to ratchet up protection for
non-political speech to an equivalent level of protection. This Section

explains why non-political speech inevitably garners the same level of
protection as political speech. It describes how foundational principles of

judicial review exert pressure on the Court to equate the value and
purpose of non-political speech with that of political speech and to evenly
apply generally applicable rules of speech protection to all types of
speech. These pressures have the incidental effect of treating political and

non-political speech alike. The upshot is a robust body of caselaw on
commercial, cultural, social, and "low-value" speech, confirming an
equal level of protection for all these types of speech as well as for
political speech.
1. Commercial Speech (or, the "Lochnerizationof the First

Amendment')
Upon first extending a "limited measure of protection" to a small
category

of

commercial

advertising

in

Virginia

Pharmacy-

"commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Supreme Court immediately began
Amendment values"' 8 8-the
broadening the category and elevating the protection of commercial
speech. In the intervening decades, the Court has recognized a prolific
expanse of economic and business-related expression as protected
commercial speech and bestowed a level of protection on such speech
commensurate with that enjoyed by all other speech, including political
speech. As the Court's prior experience with political speech
expansionism foretold, the expansion of commercial speech coverage

188 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 445, 447, 456 (1978).
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influenced its level of protection. Like political speech before it,
commercial speech's level of protection also settled quickly around the
same level of protection enjoyed by all other speech. Unlike political
speech, however, this calibration has meant that the Court has had to
ratchet up protection for commercial speech above the level it purports to
apply under the hierarchy of speech myth.
The upward trajectory of protection for commercial speech has been

identified and roundly criticized by scholars as a sort of "Lochnerization"
of the First Amendment-a way to constitutionally immunize economic
activity from regulation via the First Amendment.1 89 The phenomenon
they describe is no doubt accurate, but the impetus for why the doctrine
evolved this way remains undertheorized. It was the natural result of
foundational doctrinal principles governing First Amendment law, all of
which resist treating different speech differently, that ensured commercial
speech would never receive subordinate constitutional protection. These
principles include the generally applicable prohibitions on content and
viewpoint discrimination; the analogical reasoning model for deciding
cases, which relies on likening speech to other speech; and an institutional
reluctance by the judiciary to remove government discretion from the
spheres of government administration. These principles have consistently
overpowered the weak analytical force of the hierarchy model and
ensured its failure.
At the start of this trajectory, the Court extended First Amendment
protection to a specific category of purely commercial speech "which

does no more than propose a commercial transaction"-essentially
advertisements and solicitations for goods and services.1 90 The limiting
effect of this definition quickly fell way to the analogical reasonableness
of treating a commercial advertisement the same as the exchange of any
other commercial information, such as commercial data, product
disclosures, or business reports. From here, the natural progression of
such reasoning inevitably led courts to recognize marketing data,191

189 See sources cited supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.

190 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
191 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557, 566-67 (2011) (identifying speech in aid
of pharmaceutical marketing as protected speech).
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dues, 194
union
disclosures,' 93
signs,' 92 business
commercial
trademarks,' 95 and product labels' 96 as protected speech.
At the same time, and despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the Supreme
Court has elevated the level of protection for commercial speech to an
equal level as that enjoyed by political speech. Nominally, a regulation
on commercial speech is valid if it directly advances a "substantial"
governmental interest and "is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest."' 97 The government must show that the harms from
commercial speech "are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate

them to a material degree"' 98 but need only establish a "reasonable" or
"proportion[al]" fit between the government's interests and the means
chosen to serve them.1 99 This is the exact same level of protection
applicable to expressive conduct and speech on public property, which in
practice is the same level of protection for election-related expression, the
speech of institutional speakers, and speech that implicates national
security harms. Across the board, this level of constitutional protection
permits regulations on speech that are narrowly tailored to advancing

legitimate public safety and welfare interests and requires courts to defer
to the government's reasonable evaluation of the harms speech poses and
the means for countering them.

At first, the Court did endeavor to establish a lower level of protection
for commercial speech by establishing certain protection carve-outs. For

example, the Court originally declared commercial speech regulations
constitutional even if they are overbroad, constitute a prior restraint,
discriminate on the basis of content, or compel speech. 200 But these gaps
192 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (recognizing commercial signs as
protected speech).

193 Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (reviewing a
business disclosure as protected speech).
'94 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222, 233-35 (1977) (finding the payment
of union dues to be protected speech).

195 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763-64 (2017).

196 Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985)
(finding that advertisements for legal services constitute commercial speech).

197 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
198 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993).
'99 Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771

200

n.24 (1976) (permitting prior restraints, compelled disclosures, and content-discrimination to

regulate commercial speech); Zauderer, 471 U. S. at 650-51 (permitting compelled disclosure
of commercial information); see also Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 774 (presuming content
discrimination in commercial speech regulations is permissible).

'
&
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in protection soon closed under older and stabler doctrinal principles that
denounce the compatibility of such regulations with the First
Amendment. The protection for commercial speech thereby equalized at
the same level of protection of other speech, namely protection against
overbroad regulations, prior restraints, content and viewpoint
discrimination, and compelled disclosures. 20
In this way, the symbiotic expansion of commercial speech coverage
and commercial speech protection has led to fully equalized protection
for nearly all commercial and noncommercial speech. But what made the
relationship between the growth of coverage and the elevation of
protection symbiotic? Why could the Court not disaggregate the two and
permit protection to run to more commercial speech without ratcheting up
protection for that speech? The answer lies in three doctrinal
developments that exerted upward pressure on the level of protection for
commercial speech based on how the Court went about expanding the
First Amendment's coverage to commercial speech in the first place.2 02

First, the Court justified applying the First Amendment to commercial
speech by equating its constitutional value with that of political speech.
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court stressed that a "consumer's interest in

201 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (striking down a law
criminalizing the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal
cruelty on overbreadth grounds); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019) (holding a

bar on "immoral or scandalous" trademarks overbroad); N.Y. Mag. v. Metro. Transp. Auth.,

136 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998) (extending protection

against prior restraints to commercial speech); Desert Outdoor Advert. Inc. v. City of Moreno

Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Search of Kitty's E., 905 F.2d
1367, 1371-72 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557,
579-80 (2011) (prohibiting content discrimination in a commercial regulation); Nat'l Inst. of
Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371, 2375, 2378 (2018) (same, and
prohibiting the compelled disclosure of controversial commercial information); Pac. Gas
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1986) (protecting against compelled
commercial speech); Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138

S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018) (same).
202 The answer also lies in the Court apparently missing the trend. By the time these
transformations were fully underway, the Court declared in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network that it was constricting the category of commercial speech so that less speech was

subject to a lower level of protection. 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993). Also in Bolger v. Young Drug
Corp., the Court narrowed the definition of commercial speech in an explicit effort to
minimize the amount of speech afforded less protection. 463 U.S. 60, 66-69 (1983). The Court
was misdiagnosing its own interventions, however. In effect, the reverse was occurring: the
scope and definition of protected commercial speech was expanding while the level of
protection for that speech increased as a greater percentage of it began to touch on matters of
public concern.
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the free flow of commercial information . .. may be as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." 2 03 It
also reasoned that such information "enlighten[s] public decisionmaking
in a democracy" because it is "indispensable to the proper allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system, . . . [and] to the formation of

intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered." 204 Subsequently, in case after case, the Court reaffirmed the
value of commercial speech as vital to democratic decision making, often
describing it as more important than "urgent political dialogue" and as
"perform[ing] an indispensable role" to citizens' engagement with a free

market political economy. 205 As it did so, the line between property

regulations and speech regulations immediately began to fall away, as it
did, for example, in a case striking down a law regulating the appearance
of a state license plate as compelled political speech.2 06 It has since

likened obstructing the free flow of commercial information to banning
political parades, slogans, and picketing, 207 to withholding life-saving

information, 208 to hindering the administration of justice, 209 and to
"compel[ling] individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs." 2 10
In sum, by elevating the constitutional function of commercial speech to
that of political speech, the Court created pressure to equalize the levels

of protection for both types of speech.
Second, the Court has adopted the same theoretical justifications for
protecting commercial speech that have long supported granting strong
protection to political speech-namely that the speech advances both
individual and civic rights. Originally, the Court extended protection to
commercial speech as a function of protecting the rights of listeners to the

free flow of information but did not recognize any corresponding right of
speakers. This distinction did not hold. By the very next term, the Court
began to premise protection for commercial speech on both speakers' and

203 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
204 Id. at 765.
20

Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977). For identical reasoning, see, e.g.,

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1995); Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at

421 n.17.
206 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-17 (1977).
207 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 577 (2011).
208 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376-77 (2002).
209 Bates, 433 U.S. at 375-76, 376 n.32.
210 Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
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listeners' rights to exchange information. 21' Protection for political
speech is also premised on both the rights of speakers and listeners-it
inheres in the natural law rights of individual liberty and of equal
citizenship.2 2 Put differently, protection for political speech is based in
both the liberal and the republican traditions of rights, whereas protection
for commercial speech was originally conceived as only advancing the
republican tradition. 213 As the Court began to recognize both the speaker
and listener rights inherent in commercial speech, however, it aligned the
theoretical justifications for protecting political speech with those for
protecting commercial speech, creating more pressure to equalize the

level of protection afforded to both types of speech. 214
211 Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-59
(1978) (emphasizing the deleterious effects of in-personal legal solicitation on recipients).
212 Post & Shanor, supra note 10, at 170-71. For rich discussions of the dual speakerlistener/individual-collectivist interests supporting free speech, see Alexander Meiklejohn,
Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 26 (1960); C. Edwin Baker,
Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989); Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech
(1996); Robert C. Post, Citizens Divided 3-43 (2014).
213 These two traditions describe the two competing, though complimentary, justifications
for the freedom of speech: the liberal tradition protects speech to safeguard the individual's
interest in free expression and the republican tradition protects speech to advance society's

interest in democratic discourse. See Weiland, supra note 10, at 1402-12. Weiland has argued
persuasively that the Court has subsequently corrupted the republican tradition by

reconceptualizing "listeners" as individuals whose interests are best served by more
information, rather than as stand-ins for the public whose interests are best served by accurate

and tailored information. She argues the Court has also corrupted the liberal tradition by
transforming the right of autonomy into a naked right to be free from state regulation. The
result is a deregulatory doctrine that undermines both the rights of speakers and listeners, as
properly conceived. Her argument then goes further by stating that the Court has abandoned
listeners' rights entirely. A review of both commercial and political speech caselaw, however,
reveals that the listener rights model has not so much disappeared but rather has amalgamated
with the speaker rights model to form a hybrid theory of speech protection that draws on both

speaker and listener (liberal and republican) rights across all types of speech. For example, in
the political speech context, the doctrines governing protection for expressive conduct, speech
on public property, election and campaign speech, and government employee speech are all
influenced by the listener rights model as they seek to ensure government has the authority
and discretion to promote a safe, transparent, and free information ecosystem. While the Court
may have corrupted these traditions, both continue to undergird speech protection for all types
of speech.
214 For example, the Court reasoned that both speakers and listeners are served by the speech

at issue in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 353-56 (2010) (political expenditures, i.e.,

purely political speech), Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal

Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464-67 (2018) (public union dues, i.e., indirect or
quasi-political speech), and Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374-75 (2018) (commercial service
disclosures, i.e., purely commercial or professional speech) and accordingly applied similar
protection to all three types of speech.
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Finally, the Court has often opted to resolve cases involving speech at
the intersection of political and commercial speech by sidestepping the
question of what level of protection the speech in question deserves. This

tactic, though ostensibly an exercise in judicial restraint, further obscures
the line between commercial and political speech and thereby obfuscates
any differences in their levels of protection. The Court has employed this
tactic most frequently when confronting a regulation of commercial

speech on a matter of public policy or a regulation of commercial speech
by a political actor.2 15 Instead of fine-tuning where such speech should
fall on the hierarchy of speech protection, the Court has assumed without
deciding that the regulation is invalid under the lowest level of protection.
But to reach this result, the Court does not actually subject the regulation
to anywhere near a "low" level of protection. The analysis thereby distorts
the meaning of low protection and effectively raises it to a higher level.

Both effects contribute to the vanishing of any truly low level of
protection for commercial speech and its transformation into a heightened
level of protection akin to that enjoyed by all other protected speechincluding political speech.
2. Cultural Speech-from Memes to Memoirs

This "other" speech that is neither political nor commercial, but is
nonetheless fully and equally protected, is best described as cultural
speech. It is the body of artistic, social, and cultural production that

includes everything from a Jackson Pollock painting to a restaurant
review to a diatribe about a flailing sports team. It consists of great works

of literature as well as common and benign utterances about the everyday
vagaries of life. It includes speech that inspires and provokes and also
speech that does little more than earn a chuckle or a quizzical glance. It
can be opinionated, solely informative, or simply a passing remark or
sketch or post lacking any real purpose or even meaning.

It is also the majority of speech individuals engage in. Most discussion
is not directly on politics or business in the narrow sense, or even about
matters of public concern more generally. Rather, "[m]ost of what we say
to one another lacks religious, political, scientific, educational,

journalistic, historical, or artistic value (let alone serious value), but it is
"' See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423-24 (1993); Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at
2375, 2378; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017); cf. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465.
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still sheltered from Government regulation." 2 16 The First Amendment
draws no distinction between worthy cultural contributions and mere
gibberish. "Even '[w]holly neutral futilities ... come under the protection
of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or Donne's sermons.' "217 The
underlying assumption for this rule is that all cultural speech is integral
to the core purposes of free speech, and so merits equal protection on par
with that received by political speech. 218
The doctrine embraces this assumption for several astute reasons. The
first is that it is nearly impossible to draw any clear lines between cultural,
political, and even commercial speech, rendering any attempt to assign

different levels of protection to each an exercise in futility and prone to
extensive error. Two recent cases illustrate the point: a law banning the
distribution of animal crush videos can be read alternatively as a law
banning artistic speech in the form of a film, commercial speech in the
form of a sale, or political speech in the form of a message about animal
cruelty. 219 The same problem arises with a law banning the sale of violent
video games to minors, which also bans artistic video expression,

commercial solicitation speech, and political messaging about violence
and the treatment of women and minorities in particular.22 0
Second, even where the line is clear, the state is ill-positioned to draw
it. The very act of engaging in cultural speech of any kind is a form of
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 479-80 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)).
218 Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816 (1984)
("[E]ven though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of constitutional
protection, there are a host of other communications that command the same respect. An
assertion that 'Jesus Saves,' that 'Abortion is Murder,' that every woman has the 'Right to
Choose,' or that 'Alcohol Kills,' may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the
216
217

ordinance that is just as strong as 'Roland Vincent- City Council."'); Brown v. Ent. Merchs.

Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 796 n.4 (2010) ("Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and
intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat. But these cultural and intellectual
differences are not constitutionalones. Crudely violent video games, tawdry TV shows, and

cheap novels and magazines are no less forms of speech than The Divine Comedy, and
restrictions upon them [are entitled to the same protection as political speech]."); Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ("Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can
see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to
the protection of free speech as the best of literature.").
219 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 465. The Court left open whether videos depicting acts of extreme

animal cruelty is protected speech, id. at 472; however, this logic applies equally to videos of
hunting or Spanish bullfights, which the Court presumed to be protected speech under the First
Amendment. Id. at 479-80.
220 Brown, 564 U.S. at 789-90.
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democratic empowerment and legitimation. For the state to exercise

control within this sphere by imparting value judgments and carving it
into separate zones of protection would negate the very purpose of

extending protection to cultural speech in the first place. Cultural free
speech allows individuals to help shape the cultural systems of power that
surround them, including the work, family, and religious systems that
undergird and transcend the power of the state.22 It also serves democracy
by freeing citizens to think and discuss what matters to them, as well as
by facilitating proxy discussions of "mores, values, customs, meanings,
and emotions even if people do not want to talk about politics or public
policy in a narrower sense." 222 Similarly, cultural speech empowers

citizens to participate in the formation of public opinion, which in turn
influences governmental decision-making. 223 This process bolsters
democratic legitimation by giving citizens a "warranted belief that their
government is responsive to their wishes." 224 In short, every cultural
utterance contributes in some way, big or small, to public discourse,

making every expression of cultural speech constitutionally valuable. 225
In recognition of the myriad, often unexpected, ways cultural speech

equally contributes to the core purposes for protecting speech, the Court
has extended equal protection to it.
3. Speech-Conducive Conduct

As the Court has affirmed equal protection for all manner of social,
cultural, and economic expression, it has also expanded the reach of that
protection further afield to certain social and economic conduct. In other

words, it has further blurred the boundaries between speech and conduct
221 Balkin, Cultural Democracy, supra note 18, at 1061.
222 Id. at 1070-71, 1078.
223 See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,
48 UCLA L. Rev. 1,

7 (2000).
224

Id.; see also Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 601
(1990) (noting that the Court's extension of First Amendment protection to outrageous or
offensive speech reflects a desire to foster the development of public opinion); Robert Post,

Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 1109 (1993) (identifying the values in both traditional and collectivist theories of free
speech to preserve robust systems of self-determination and self-government).
225 A particularly memorable expression of cultural "gibberish" in the caselaw-a student
banner with the phrase "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"-itself resulted in thousands of media stories,
countless dinner table and classroom conversations, and several court cases including a major

Supreme Court case on student speech rights. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
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at the same time it has blurred the boundaries between types of speech.
This blurring has driven the extension of First Amendment protection to
reach an increasing amount of "speech-conducive" conduct, meaning
conduct that may incidentally communicate a message on the part of the
doer simply by their engaging in that conduct. For example, the Court has
extended the protection applicable to political, social, cultural, and
commercial speech to such political, social, cultural, and commercial
227
conduct as, respectively, paying union dues,2 2 6 baking a wedding cake,

nude dancing, 228 and pharmaceutical marketing.2 29

The extension of First Amendment protection to speech-conducive

conduct follows on the coattails of the extension of protection to
expressive conduct. At its start, the Court drove First Amendment
protection down the speech/conduct continuum in a series of cases all
involving overtly expressive conduct, such as saluting the flag, 230
displaying a red communist flag, 231 conducting a silent sit-in, 232 or
wearing a black armband. 233 This type of conduct is best described as
"speech-conduct," as it is a form of silent communication incidentally
actuated through behavior. The Court took the next step down the
continuum by extending protection to less obviously communicative acts,

best labeled "expressive conduct," such as nude dancing234 and selecting
participants in a cultural parade. 23 ' As discussed above, the Court claimed
226 Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,246365 (2018) (applying "exacting scrutiny" to agency-fee requirements).
227 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723, 1728
(2018). The majority opinion in Masterpiece did not explicitly hold that baking a custom
wedding cake is protected speech but alluded as much, describing the designing and creation
of a wedding cake as the baker's "own personal expression" and cryptically asserting that

seeing the creation of a wedding cake as an exercise of protected speech can "deepen our

understanding" of the First Amendment. See also id. at 1744, 1744 n.3 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (describing the creation of custom wedding cakes as "expressive" and "artistry").
228 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion) (applying the
O'Brien standard to an ordinance on nude dancing).
229 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (applying "heightened judicial
scrutiny" to a regulation on "[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing ... [as] a form of
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment").
230 W Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
231 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931).
232 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201-02 (1961) (Harlan J., concurring) (sit-ins at
segregated lunch counters); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (silent sit-in at
a library to protest segregation).
233 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
234 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000) (plurality opinion).
231 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Grp. Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1995).
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to apply less stringent protection to expressive conduct, though in reality

it enjoys essentially the same level of protection as other protected
speech. 236 Finally, the outward trajectory of First Amendment coverage
to conduct has reached activities that only incidentally communicate a
message, best termed "speech-conducive conduct." This category of
"speech" consists of routine, often commercial, conduct usually engaged
in for entirely non-expressive purposes, but that is conducive to being a
vehicle for the expression of a message, such as data collection, artful
product production, and information sharing. By extending equal First

Amendment protection to such conduct, the Court has again elevated a
broad swath of activity to the same constitutional position as speech that

more integrally serves the political, cultural, and individual values
underlying the freedom of speech.
This trajectory has been driven in large part by the Court's reluctance
to delineate any clear distinction between speech and conduct. It
attempted a test at the height of the explosion of First Amendment
coverage in Spence v. Washington, defining a category of symbolic

conduct as an activity that is "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication[,]" based on the "nature of [the] activity [and] the factual
context and environment in which it was undertaken." 237 Lacking both

clarity and comprehensiveness, the Spence test has failed to govern a line
between protected speech and unprotected conduct. 23 8 Instead, courts tend
to avoid the question of whether an act is speech for the conclusory view
that certain conduct is naturally or obviously speech and other conduct is
not. 239 This lack of criteria has pushed the First Amendment to cover an

increasing amount of speech-conducive conduct, elevating a broad swath

236
237

See supra Subsection I.B.3 (describing the O'Brien standard of protection).
Spence v. Washington, 418 US 405, 409-10 (1974). The Court also identified as

instructive whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by

those who viewed it." Id. at 410-11.
238 Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1250-60
(1995) (discussing the incoherence and shortcomings of the Spence test).
239 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 13 (observing that courts tend to
presuppose whether the First Amendment applies to the conduct at issue); Schauer, Categories
and the First Amendment, supra note 139, at 267-82 (describing the incongruences in First
Amendment doctrine between protected and unprotected speech, including between speech

and conduct).
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of social and commercial activity to the constitutional status of protected
speech. 240
The potential consequences of constitutionalizing ordinary activity like
paying for a service, using information gathered from customers, and
creating a product are striking. Yet this is where First Amendment

doctrine has landed on the speech/conduct continuum with insufficient
judicial second thought. In Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, andMunicipal Employees, Council 31, for example, no member

of the Court paused to consider whether paying union dues implicates the
freedom of speech, assuming uncritically that this employment-related
transaction is a form of compelled political speech.241 The Court has
similarly never deliberately assessed why certain political expenditures,
such as those that go towards campaign operational costs, are protected
speech as opposed to unprotected employer transactional costs. 242 The

Court elided the same question in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission and Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,

assuming without analysis that the creation of a commercial product and
the use of a commercial dataset both implicate the freedom of speech. 24 3
If such business and employer-related activity is protected speech
simply because it involves the use of information or potentially
communicates a message, it is hard to imagine what activity would not be
entitled to First Amendment protection-especially in the digital age.
Everything from pension contributions and healthcare fees to selling a
product or using information for purchasing decisions would seemingly
be protected speech-conducive conduct.
Having explored the issue of First Amendment coverage of
communicative conduct in great depth, Frederick Schauer recently left it
to future scholarship to discuss the normative arguments for tweaking the
levels of speech protection in light of this outward expansion of
coverage.24 4 This Article begins to address just this question in Part II.
Here, it is simply important to note that the expansion of coverage to
240 Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 318, 322-23 (2018);
Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 Wm.
Mary L. Rev. 1613, 1619 (2015) [hereinafter Schauer, Politics and Incentives].
241

138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).

See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738 (2008) (analyzing political expenditures solely as
facilitating political messaging as opposed to operational costs); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 736 (2011) (same).
243 See 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018); 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
244 Schauer, Politics and Incentives, supra note 240, at 1636.
242
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speech-conducive conduct through a process of equating it with speech-

conduct has resulted in a body of previously unprotected or less protected
expression receiving equal speech protection.
4. Low-Value Speech

Another category of speech that has garnered increased protection to
the point that much of it now enjoys equal protection with political speech
is "low-value" speech. This category includes solacious, violent,

threatening, deceitful, obscene, and defamatory speech. Under the myth
of the hierarchy of speech protection, the Court has claimed to place such
speech on the hierarchy's lowest rung where it receives minimal

protection commensurate with its minimal value for advancing the core
functions of the freedom of speech. This framework existed in rhetoric

but not so much in reality. Both before and after inventing the hierarchy,
the Court has consistently analyzed whether low-value speech is
protected by considering whether the expression at issue is categorically
unprotected, not whether it is less protected. 24 5
The Court finally abandoned its purported reliance on a hierarchical,

value-based framework for protecting low-value speech in a trio of
successive cases: United States v. Stevens, Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association, and United States v. Alvarez.24 6 In its place, the
Court adopted an explicit categorical approach: low-value speech is either
entirely excluded from First Amendment protection or entitled to equal
First Amendment protection as "high-value" speech. 247 These cases are

widely studied for having developed a somewhat novel historical test for
deciding whether speech falls inside or outside First Amendment
coverage. A lesser analyzed consequence of the Court's intervention here,
however, is that it explicitly abandoned the hierarchical model of speech
protection for this category of speech. In effect, the Court lopped off the
bottom rung of the hierarchy and thus began to realign its methodological

245 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam); United States v. Reidel, 402
U.S. 351 (1971); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2003); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2009).
246 559 U.S. 460 (2009); 564 U.S. 786 (2010); 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
247 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468-72; Brown, 564 U.S. at 791-93; Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717-22.
But see infra Subsection I.C.5 (discussing how even categorically excluded speech is protected
from content- and viewpoint-based discrimination).
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approach away from myth and towards a more accurate description of the
doctrine. 248

By narrowing the categories of unprotected speech to only those that
have a historical tradition of being regulated, the Court effectively
ratcheted up protection for a significant amount of speech that purportedly
had received low protection. The very speech at issue in Stevens, Brown,
and Alvarez is instructive. In each case, the Government unsuccessfully
argued that the underlying speech-depictions of animal cruelty, violent

video games, and false statements-is entitled to minimal protection and
is thus more broadly regulable to prevent the substantial social harms such
speech poses. 249 In rejecting this proposition entirely, the Court extended

equal First Amendment protection to a body of lies, violence, and vitriol
as it has to art, protest, and poetry. 2

0

However, because this level of

protection is properly understood as moderate, not absolute, legislatures
have retained the authority to regulate vile and hazardous speech to the
extent it substantially threatens a safe, healthy, and informed public
discourse.
Discarding the category of lesser-protected low-value speech has also

opened another door for newer forms of speech, long thought of as having
little or no First Amendment protection, to claim equal protection from
regulation. This category of speech includes technological speech like
data and digital information, as well as speech that has only recently come
under the regulation of modern labor, financial, and civil rights laws.25 1
Because none of this speech has a long tradition of regulation, it stands to
reason that it also should receive First Amendment protection on par with
other protected speech-and in this case, extending only moderate
248 Genevieve Lakier has argued that the categorical approach is inconsistent with the
Court's historical treatment of low-value speech, even if, as this Article argues, it is more
consistent with the doctrine in other ways. See Lakier, supra note 2.
249 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469-70 (discussing government's argument that "[w]hether a given

category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing
of the value of the speech against its societal costs"); Brown, 564 U.S. at 792-93 (seeing
government compare violent video games to obscenity); Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718 (discussing
government's argument that lies have no First Amendment value and hence are not entitled to
full First Amendment protection).
250 Another notable consequence of embracing the categorical approach is it leaves the Court

with a very blunt tool for "referee[ing] the paradigmatic conflicts of a modern, pluralistic
political order." Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps? 132 Harv. L. Rev. 28,30 (2018).
251 For example, myriad social and economic expression has come under the regulation of
modern anti-discrimination statutes, including architectural design choices under the

Americans with Disabilities Act and organization membership, employment hiring, and
business service decisions under anti-discrimination public accommodations laws.
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protection to such speech will be necessary to preserve a well-functioning,
vibrant, and inclusive economic sphere.
5. Content- and Viewpoint-Based Laws
Lastly, the Supreme Court has not only directly equalized protection
for non-political and political speech in contravention of the hierarchy of

speech protection, but it has also doubled down on certain neutral and
generally applicable principles in the doctrine that incidentally push all
types of speech to the same level of protection. In particular, the Court's

sweeping prohibitions on viewpoint- and content-based laws exert an
equalizing force on all speech that contributes to the doctrine only
supporting one equal level of protection for speech.

Content-based regulations are laws that apply to only certain speech
depending on the topic, subject-matter, or idea expressed. 5
matter, such laws 'are presumptively unconstitutional.'"

2

"As a general
Viewpoint-

25 3

based laws target speech based on the particular ideology, opinion, or
perspective conveyed, and are "thus an egregious form of content
discrimination. "254 The Court "stringent[ly]" protects all speech against
both types of laws, reflecting the "fundamental principle that
governments have 'no power to restrict expression because of its message,

its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.' "255

Viewpoint-based

restrictions on speech are seemingly never allowed, and content-based

restrictions are only permissible in limited circumstances, such as to
single out traditionally unprotected categories of speech for regulation. 25 6

The prohibition on viewpoint- and content-based laws is a general
principle of speech protection that applies as equally to high-value speech
as it does to everyday speech. It thus serves not only to equalize protection

amongst categories of protected speech but also to elevate the mundane
"speech of life" to this same level of protection. The Court has confirmed
that the bar against content- and viewpoint-based restrictions applies as

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (quoting
Reed, 576 U.S. at 163).
254 Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
255 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972)).
256 Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2010) (noting that the First Amendment
252
25

permits content-based restrictions in "limited areas" such as obscenity, incitement, and

fighting words).
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equally to political, 257 commercial, 258 religious, 25 9 and cultural speech, 260
as it does to low-value speech, 2 61 trademarked speech, 2 62 and speech by
institutional speakers. 2 63 Even within unprotected categories of speech,
the government may not regulate only some speech on the basis of content
or viewpoint. 2 " The breadth of these prohibitions means they reach
entirely clerical speech, such as debt collection calls 265 and directional
signage. 266 By constitutionally immunizing such speech from government

regulation to the same degree as all other speech, the uncompromising
principle against content- and viewpoint-based laws exerts a strong
equalizing force on the First Amendment's protection for all speech.

The rule against content and viewpoint discrimination in First
Amendment law is foundational, and yet it also directly conflicts with the
hierarchy of speech model. It wins out over the hierarchy every time,

257 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315, 318, 334 (1988) (striking down ban on signs within a
certain distance of a foreign embassy that would tend to bring the embassy's government into

"public disrepute,"-termed "classically political speech"-as impermissible content-based
restriction on speech).
258 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564 (2011) (striking down a law prohibiting
the use of data for marketing purposes as an impermissible content-based regulation on

speech); Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (striking down a requirement that certain reproductive

service providers post an informational disclosure relating to their businesses as an
impermissible content-based regulation on speech).
259 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993)
(striking down prohibition on using public school property for religious meetings during nonschool hours as impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination).
260 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
115-16 (1991) (striking down law imposing financial burdens on literary works mentioning
the author's crimes as impermissible content-based restriction on speech).
261 Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 131 (1989) (striking down ban
on indecent interstate commercial telephone messages as impermissible content-based
regulation).
262 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297, 2302 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744,

1751 (2017) (striking down content and viewpoint-based restrictions on registering a
trademark).
263 Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23, 837 (1995) (striking down
university regulation limiting the use of student activity funds for activities that primarily

promote a belief in a deity); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969) (requiring the state "show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular

viewpoint").
264 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
265 Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2343 (2005).
266 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 164 (2015).
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however, because it has a long tradition in the caselaw, 267 is a highly
rational and effective means of ferreting out speech restrictions enacted
for illicit purposes, 268 and is entirely consistent with the other fundamental
principles that create the scaffolding of free speech jurisprudence. 269
Additionally, it serves the interests underlying granting political speech
preferred protection more successfully than the hierarchy does because it

does not depend on the impossible task of distinguishing between political
and non-political speech. Rather, content neutrality operates as an

overinclusive means of achieving the kind of political neutrality that is
necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of government regulation.
In contrast, as discussed in the next section, the hierarchy of speech
protection lacks all these attributes: it was a late and unmoored doctrinal
invention that does a poor job of protecting the legitimacy of the

democratic process. For these reasons, the hierarchy was never able to
truly acquire any methodological heft, persisting instead as little more
than a doctrinal myth-rhetorically powerful but analytically toothless.
D. Reasons the HierarchyFailedbut the Myth Persisted
The preceding reevaluation of the doctrine of free speech protection

reveals that the oft cited and widely accepted hierarchy of speech
protection is a myth. At one end, the doctrine does not strenuously protect
political speech from government regulation, nor does it highly privilege
protection for political speech over other speech. At the other end, the

doctrine roundly resists bestowing minimal protection on non-political
267 See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943);
Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).

268 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First

Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1996); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[The rule against content-based laws]
reflects important insights into the meaning of the free speech principle-for instance, that
content-based speech restrictions are especially likely to be improper attempts to value some
forms of speech over others, or are particularly susceptible to being used by the government
to distort public debate.. .. And, perhaps most importantly, no better alternative has yet come

to light.").
269 The content-neutrality principle crystalized around the same time as the hierarchy of
speech protection was invented, yet it was the rule against content discrimination that became
the most important principle in free speech jurisprudence. See, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, Content

Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 189 (1983) (calling it "the
most pervasively employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free expression"); Leslie
Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 Va. L. Rev. 231, 232 (2012) (noting that for
forty years it has served as the "touchstone of First Amendment law").
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speech and levels up the protection for such speech to the point that the
protection enjoyed by all speech equals out. The questions remain,

however, why did the hierarchy of speech protection, and its central tenet
that political speech garners strict protection, only ever amount to a
doctrinal myth? And given that it did not ultimately take hold in the
doctrine, why has the myth persisted? Finally, what effects has the
hierarchy myth had on the doctrine, if any? This section addresses each
question.
First, why did the hierarchy'sfoundational tenet thatpoliticalspeech
garnersupmost protection never come to fruition? The answer here likely

lies in the Court's consistent understanding, both stated and implied, that
absolute political autonomy rarely serves the interests of the First
Amendment. Very high levels of political autonomy produce a slanted,
crowded, and inefficient marketplace of ideas dominated by noise, chaos,
danger, power, and inequality. The effect of such a marketplace is
ultimately to undermine the principle of political autonomy itself. Thus,
much like economic autonomy in a laissez faire market, political
autonomy requires some regulation for its own survival and requires that
individual autonomy be subordinated at times to the welfare of a political
system in which political liberty can flourish. 27 0 The Court has
consistently woven this logic into its political speech cases, as seen above
in Section I.B. That reevaluation of political speech caselaw shows how
the Court's embrace of moderate speech protection resembles a
substantive form of proportionality review-one focused on balancing
speech rights and democratic governance. And while this observation
supports proposals to explicitly adopt proportionality review for political

speech regulations, 27 1 it more so reveals that the Court is already doing
this under the cover of differently labelled doctrinal standards.
270

Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1410 (1986)

(arguing that autonomy is protected not as an intrinsic value but as an instrumental value for

freedom of speech).
271 Proportionality review more evenly balances a regulation's speech-related harms against
its public interest justifications, giving due deference to legislative judgments without blindly
invoking political autonomy as an intrinsic value onto itself. Justice Breyer has been a vocal
proponent of adopting such a standard. See Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct.

2335, 2362-63 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709,
730-31 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155,
179 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional
Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 Yale L.J. 3094, 3140-41 (2015) (discussing
proportionality review and United States v. Alvarez); Gregoire Webber, Proportionality and
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Importantly, where the Court departs from this moderate standard of
protection for political speech, it is not comporting with the hierarchy of
speech by privileging political speech over other speech. Rather, it is

applying a heightened level of protection across the board to political and
non-political speech alike. When it does this, as in its campaign finance
cases, the Court is acting anomalously. It is abandoning its long-standing

wariness of absolute political autonomy and risking the doctrinal integrity
of the free speech project as a whole. Speech equalization is not the
problem in these cases so much as the heightening of speech protection
is; outsized protection, not equal protection, is what risks undermining the

interests served by the freedom of speech and is inconsistent with the
majority of political speech doctrine.
Second, why did the hierarchical model of speech protection not take

hold after the Court adopted it? Three foundational deficiencies are
responsible for the hierarchy's failure: it lacks a solid historical basis, it
lacks internal cohesion, and it lacks coherence with other fundamental
principles and theories of free speech protection. It thus ultimately proved
incompatible with how the doctrine developed after its invention.
The hierarchy's lack of historical basis was explored in Section L.A

above, which showed how the hierarchy was untethered from and in
conflict with the doctrine's long tradition of extending equal protection to
all types of covered speech. Without the benefit of historical vetting, the

invented hierarchy ultimately betrayed serious internal and external
inconsistencies, creating an unstable and ultimately unusable doctrine.
The hierarchy's internal cohesion was undermined from the start as the
Court invented the hierarchy in the process of expanding protection to
commercial speech by comparing the value of commercial speech to that

of political speech. 27 2 In this way, commercial speech doctrine contained
the seeds of its own radicalization at inception. The idea to tether speech's

273
protection to its varying values was thus elusive from the beginning.

Limitations on Freedom of Speech 1 (LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 7, 2019)
(reviewing the use of proportionality in the judiciary); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech in the
Balance 49 (2020) (suggesting that proportionality has a place in the judiciary).
272 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 76165 (1976).
273 The other case responsible for the invention of the hierarchy, Buckley v. Valeo, began

the process of grafting the value of core political speech onto peripheral political speech, like
campaign spending, by comparing campaign finance disclosure laws to an Alabama law the
Court overturned in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 451, 466 (1958), which attempted to
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This incoherence made the hierarchy entirely self-defeating. The lynchpin
of the model is that political speech garners special, outsized protection
in our constitutional system; yet this principle then justified granting the

same level of protection to other speech that might have political value
which is, in all reality, all speech. Elevating political speech to a vaulted
status thus exerted a gravitation pull on all other speech, making the myth
itself partly responsible for its own nonrealization.
The hierarchy also fits uncomfortably with other principles and
theories undergirding free speech protection. It is inconsistent with the

two most central principles of free speech law: the generally appliable
bans on viewpoint and content discrimination, which oppose drawing
distinctions between types of speech. It is also incompatible with the
dominant theories of free speech protection because a hierarchy model
does not accurately reflect the degree to which different types of speech
contribute to achieving First Amendment interests. As Part II will

describe in greater detail, all speech, in varied, complex, and changing
ways, advances the values of self-expression, self-government, and the
discovery and acquisition of knowledge and truth.
For all these reasons, the hierarchy was fundamentally at odds with the
direction free speech theory developed after its invention. Many scholars
have recognized that there are essentially two competing theories of the

freedom of speech: one based in democracy, equality, and republicanism
(the "political equality" theory), and the other based in autonomy, liberty,
and liberalism (the "political liberty" theory). 274 When in tension, political
liberty has predominately won out over political equality since the
1970s.2 75 The political liberty theory of speech protection understands

speech as a system involving the free flow of information. 276 Political
liberty is not the same as political autonomy, which the Court has guarded
against, but rather is concerned with preserving the free movement of

shut down the NAACP's political advocacy in the state by forcing the organization to disclose
its membership list. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
274 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 Harv. L. Rev.
143, 144-45 (2010); Meiklejohn, supra note 212, at 36-37 (identifying a freedom of speech
distinct from a liberty of speech); Zechariah Chafee Jr., Free Speech in the United States 33
(1941) (describing an individual and a social interest in free speech); Fiss, supra note 212, at
3 (distinguishing between the libertarian and democratic theory of speech). For discussion and
refinement of these theories, see Weiland, supra note 10, at 1402-12; Balkin, Cultural
Democracy, supra note 18, at 1054; Kessler & Pozen, supra note 11, at 1979-81.
275 Weiland, supra note 10.
276 Sullivan, supra note 274, at 158, 174.
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information independent of government regulation. 277 The liberty theory
of speech protection accords with the Court's rationales for extending
First Amendment protection to commercial speech, 278 campaign finance

speech, 279 and low-value speech. 280 Once the Court (liberals and
conservatives alike) determined to prioritize the free flow of information,
there was little doctrinal hook left to justify differentiating between types
of information as the hierarchy purports to do. Under a theory of political

liberty, all information is equally entitled to equal protection.
Third, why has the hierarchy myth persisted? A number of social and

cultural forces are responsible for the myth's persistence. First, the
hierarchy myth has likely endured in no small part because lawyers
employ it and law professors teach it. The myth reflects the legal position

advanced by all of the most powerful free speech interest groups across
the ideological spectrum, including corporations, labor unions, and
nonprofit organizations dedicated to protecting First Amendment rights.
These groups have invested in this narrative from the beginning to
accomplish their preferred policy outcomes through the courts. 28 1 More
widely, in briefs, casebooks, legal scholarship, and popular literature

alike, the legal community has continued to revere a common set of
supposedly groundbreaking "speech-vindication" cases, 282 and largely
277 Id. But see Weiland, supra note 10, at 1396-97 (arguing that the Court has transformed

the principle of political liberty into one of political autonomy, replacing the interest in the
free flow of information with a naked interest in simply being free from government
regulation).
278 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763
(1976); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 533-35
(1980). But see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 4, 12-15

(striking down regulation requiring more information be given to consumers); Nat'l Inst. of

Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371, 2378 (2018) (same).
279 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339-41, 354-56 (2010); 1st Nat'l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776, 781-83 (1978). But see Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett,. 564 U.S. 721, 728 (2011) (striking down campaign finance program
that produces more political speech).
280
281

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
See sources cited supra note 23. A common trope employed to advance this narrative is

the notion of American exceptionalism as a nationalist project, in this case through the
argument that the First Amendment proudly grants incomparable protection to speech.
282 These include such prominent cases as Brandenburgv. Ohio, New York Times v. Sullivan,
The Pentagon Papers Case, and Citizens United. These cases comprise a sort of First
Amendment "public canon." See, e.g., Greene, supra note 250, at 40. Greene argues that courts
rarely weigh whether an infringement on protected speech goes too far and instead only ask

whether the speech is protected at all, using Buckley and Citizens United as support. But as

ignored
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or

relegated

"speech-restrictive"

cases

as

narrow,

uncharacteristic, or presumptively incorrect. 283 The impression this gives

is that the speech-vindication cases are leading and foundational, whereas
the speech-restriction cases are fact-bound and uninfluential. In reality,
the foundational cases are highly idiosyncratic and full of bluster, while
the countless periphery cases are far more representative of free speech

law's actual dimensions. 284
The popular prominence of the mythologized First Amendment may

help explain why the Supreme Court has never disavowed it, and indeed
continues to strongly propagate it. The myth enables the Court to appear

highly speech-protective without much risk of downside. The Court tends
to employ the hierarchy myth most robustly in cases that affect very little
speech, very few individuals, or that have very few public safety
implications. For example, it relies on the hierarchy in cases involving
eccentric speech, 285 cases of extreme speech suppression that enable the
Court to strike down the challenged regulation while upholding (or
creating) a speech-restrictive standard, 286 and cases challenging statutes
that can easily be tweaked to still address the social harms at issue. 287 In
this Article makes clear, those cases are more anomalous than representative and more speechrestrictive than their reputations acknowledge.
283 Cases that fit this narrative include those discussed at length supra Section I.B, including
HumanitarianLaw Projectand Nieves (providing minimal protection for speech that threatens
national security); Pickering, Safely and The Time Warner Cases (permitting ample restriction
of institutional speakers' political rights), or Williams-Yulee, Taxpayers for Vincent,

Anderson-Burdick, and Burson (all permitting widespread regulation of core political speech).
284 Cf. Ammori, supra note 118, at 63-64 (documenting a similar trend in teaching First

Amendment law that marginalizes electronic media cases and focuses on cases involving
lesser-used methods of communication like leafletting and burning flags).
285 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012) (lying about receiving the Medal of
Honor); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2010) (producing animal crush
videos); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (sending indecent messages to minors);
Nat'l Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1977) (marching in Nazi
uniforms).
286 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06, 513-14
(1969) (overturning ban on wearing armbands in school while establishing a low standard for
school speech protection); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987) (overturning ban on inmate
marriages while establishing rational basis standard of review for restricting fundamental
rights, including First Amendment rights, in prison); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07
(1989) (reaffirming the lenient O'Brien standard for political expressive conduct).
287 See, e.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715 (plurality opinion) (permitting the criminalization of
lying about the Medal of Honors for gain or profit, which Congress subsequently enacted
through the Stolen Valor Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-12); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 481-82 (declining

to protect

the depiction

of extreme

animal cruelty,

which Congress

subsequently
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this way, the Court can use the rhetoric of the hierarchy to appear to
vindicate speech rights with little danger of public backlash, social
discord, or public safety consequences. 288 Conversely, the Court shelves
the hierarchy myth, or uses it as analytical window dressings only, in
cases that risk more widespread disruption to public order and safety. 2 89
The myth thus permits the Court to advance the illusion of rights without
consequences.
Fourth, what effects has the myth had on FirstAmendment law? The
strongest impact the hierarchy myth has had on the law is having fostered

a robust free speech culture that shapes the environment in which legal
decisions are made. The myth has seeped into both legal and popular
perceptions about the meaning of free speech and the scope of the First
Amendment's protection for speech. These perceptions impact

legislatures, government officials, culture makers, and business leaders in
crafting laws and policies that affect speech. It is impossible to measure

the number of speech-restrictive bills never passed or government and
business actions never taken based on ingrained presumptions about, and
entrenched commitments to, the mythologized speech right. 290
An attendant effect of the myth is making First Amendment law appear
more unique and exceptionally stringent as compared to the free speech
jurisprudence of other democratic nations. The myth masks the significant

and pervasive use of rights balancing in the doctrine, as well as the high
levels of deference given to the government in weighing speech rights

criminalized); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (permitting criminalization of cross
burnings that threaten or intimidate). These cases thus appear to be strong "speech
vindication" cases but are ultimately fairly inconsequential.
288

The political speech cases that do garner public backlash consistently seem to be those

that overturn speech restrictions affecting many thousands or millions of individuals, such as
Citizens United and Janus. Mimi Murray Digby Marziani, Growing Backlash Against
'Citizens United', Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/growing-backlash-against-citizens-united [https://perma.cc/E5SB-GG

B4]; Alena Semuels, Is This the End of Public-Sector Unions in America?, The Atlantic (June
27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/janus-afscme-public-sectorunions/563879/ [https://perma.cc/S6QB-6Y4H].
289 See, e.g., supra Section I.B, for discussion on the national security cases (including
Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project, Nieves v. Bartlett, and Hartman v. Moore), the time,
place, and manner standard for regulating speech in public, the lenient standards for restricting

speech in schools, prisons, and around election sites, and the qualified immunity and other
abstention doctrines as all providing ample authority to law enforcement to ensure public order
and safety.
290

See Balkin, Cultural Hardball, supra note 4, at 580 (discussing how law is shaped by

governing political, social, and historical constraints).
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against social harms-both of which are hallmarks of the European model
of speech protection but widely presumed antithetical to the First
Amendment's approach. 29 1 Though U.S. free speech doctrine employs

unique methodologies and reaches some singular outcomes, it is not an
outlier in following the general international standard for protecting free
speech by substantively balancing individual rights and public interests,
as well as by extending significant deference to democratically elected
legislatures to calibrate this balance. The upshot of exposing the myth of

this particular narrative is acutely consequential in the digital age as
communications infrastructure globalizes and falls under multiple legal
jurisdictions. 2 92
Beyond perpetuating an impactful cultural and legal narrative of robust
speech tolerance, the persistence of the hierarchy myth has affected First
Amendment law in two important ways. First, as discussed, the hierarchy
has paradoxically contributed to the equalization of speech protection,
and thus to the overall lowering of speech protection below what the

public imagines it to be. Second, the myth has guided (or at least
accurately reflects) First Amendment law in one, possibly two, areas:
false political speech and, possibly, private political expression.
As to the latter, private political discussion does garner near absolute
protection from government regulation. It is not clear, however, whether

private political speech is relatively more protected than any other speech
uttered in the home or in private conversation. Additionally, even if it
were more protected, it is far from clear whether its strict protection
derives from the First Amendment, as opposed to (or in conjunction with)
the liberty rights safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of
privacy in the home and family life and of bodily and intellectual
autonomy. 293 Query then whether it does not also protect the right to
See Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech in the Balance 49-50 (2020).
See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2011, 2032-33 (2018)
[hereinafter Balkin, Free Speech] (discussing how free expression must adapt in a digitalized
and globalized speech ecosystem).
293 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (privacy in family life); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (privacy in home); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (bodily
autonomy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (family life, home, and bodily
autonomy); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (intellectual autonomy); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703
(1997) (finding the liberty protected under the Due Process Clause extends to those rights that
291

292
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engage in private political discourse. Indeed, where the Court has
reviewed laws that invade speech within the home, it has consistently
relied on their affront to individual liberty in finding a First Amendment
violation. 294
The protection that false political speech enjoys, however, comports

exactly with the hierarchy of speech model. False speech may be the only
speech that receives different levels of constitutional protection
depending on what type of speech is at issue. False political speech is
protected to the same degree as any other type of political speech. 295 Even

defamatory political speech garners robust protection and occupies a
privileged position in First Amendment law-so much so that it uniquely
supplants the general prohibitions against speaker-based and content-

based distinctions by pegging protection for defamatory statements to the
content of the speech and the public role of the defamed party. 296
Conversely, false commercial speech is certainly less protected and may

are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"); cf. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d
508, 511 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that criminal law may not punish private fantasy because "a
person's inclinations and fantasies are his own and beyond the reach of the government"
(citation omitted)).
294 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) ("A special respect for
individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and our law[;] ... that principle

has special resonance when the government seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak
there.... Whereas the government's need to mediate among various competing uses,

including expressive ones, for public streets and facilities is constant and unavoidable[,] . . . its
need to regulate temperate speech from the home is surely much less pressing .... " (emphasis

omitted) (citations omitted)); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-09 (1990) (reaffirming the
specific holding in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), that the government may not
criminalize private possession of books or materials in the home out of "a paternalistic interest

in regulating [the] mind").
295 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721-22 (2012) (explaining instances in which
false speech is regulable, but rejecting that false speech is a presumptively unprotected
category).
296 Defamation law requires a showing of actual malice if the defamed party is a public

figure and the speech involves a public issue, whereas the same speech involving a private
figure only requires negligence for liability (and a showing of actual malice for punitive

damages). N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (articulating the actual
malice standard); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 323-24 (1974) (declining to
extend the Sullivan standard to media defamation of private persons). Falsity alone permits
recovery for defamatory speech against a private figure involving a private matter. See Dun

& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) ("In light of the
reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that
the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent
a showing of 'actual malice."').
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even be fully unprotected. 297 Similarly, false statements made under oath
or for personal or financial gain are categorically unprotected under the
First Amendment as types of perjury and fraud. There are, therefore, a

few corners of the law governing torts involving speech that do
incorporate aspects of the hierarchy-but they are corners only.
Lastly, it is possible that the hierarchy myth will do some salvaging
work in addressing the growing deregulatory effects of the Court's robust
prohibition on content-based laws. There are, at this moment, countless
content-based statutes on the books, especially in the realm of industry
regulations and professional standards. Clearly, to maintain a safe and
effective financial sector, medical profession, environment, and
manufacturing industry (to name just a few), the government must be able
to regulate professional and commercial speech by content in some
way. 298 Yet it is far from clear whether the Court will resist equalizing
speech protection in these contexts. If it does, the hierarchy myth provides
a doctrinal hook for protecting industry-speech at a lower level that
permits content-based regulations.
Scholars and Justices alike have often warned against the harmful
effects of equalizing speech. In particular, they caution that speech

equalization will result in the dilution of protection for political speech. 299
297 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(cabining protected commercial speech to that which is lawful and not "misleading").
298 See, e.g., Post & Shanor, supra note 10, at 178 (outlining the practical necessity of
content-based regulations in medicine to ensure patients receive accurate and reliable health

information).
299 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47

Ind. L.J. 1, 27 (1971); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First
Amendment, 56 Cin. L. Rev. 1181, 1194 (1988) ("Were existing first amendment rules to be
applied to commercial speech, we can foresee similar dangers of doctrinal dilution, where
'doctrinal dilution' refers to the possibility that some existing first amendment rule would lose
some of its strength because of the number of unacceptable applications it would generate
when its new applications were added."); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 178 (2015)
(Breyer, J., concurring) ("I recognize that the Court could escape the problem by watering
down the force of the presumption against constitutionality that 'strict scrutiny' normally
carries with it. But, in my view, doing so will weaken the First Amendment's protection in

instances where 'strict scrutiny' should apply in full force."); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377,403 (1992) (White, J., concurring) ("By placing fighting words, which the Court has
long held to be valueless, on at least equal constitutional footing with political discourse and
other forms of speech that we have deemed to have the greatest social value, the majority
devalues the latter category."); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)
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But it seems their worries are somewhat outdated, having missed that
speech protection is already largely equalized, and that their concern of

dilution is not a prospective challenge but a present and unremarkable
aspect of the doctrine. Political speech protection is diluted, and it is

largely equivalent to the protection enjoyed by all other speech. Whether
this tempered level of protection for political speech, and its equal

application to all other speech, is normatively desirable is the question
Part II takes up.
II. THE NORMATIVE VALUE OF EQUAL SPEECH PROTECTION
Discarding the myth of a hierarchy of speech protection and embracing
the principle of speech equality has enormous normative potential. "Every

theory of free speech protection is also a theory of free speech
regulation." 30 0 Equal speech protection is thus also about equal speech
regulation. As Professor Tim Wu has astutely insisted: "The protection of
a healthy speech environment in our times demands a rethinking of what

it means to protect the channels of political speech .... "30 1 The
rethinking needed is not a reconstruction of the doctrine itself but rather
a reconceptualization of it-understanding that the doctrine roundly
permits regulations on political speech to advance democratic governance

and translating this lesson into the modern-day speech context.
Free speech has always permitted the government to protect citizens'

ability to healthily engage with political information. Today, this means
it must permit regulation of the channels of political discourse to protect

against deception, harassment, and manipulation. Where policymakers
discount this approach, they have misunderstood the doctrine; and where
the Supreme Court has disallowed such regulations, it has misapplied the
doctrine. Shattering the hierarchy myth and explicitly foregrounding the
principle of equal speech protection ought to illuminate the many

("To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech

alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment

to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment

values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.").
300 Balkin, Cultural Democracy, supra note 18, at 1063.
301 Wu, supra note 157, at 549.
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constitutional paths forward for safeguarding a healthy, honest, and
informed public discourse.
The countervailing arguments supporting a hierarchy of speech
protection and near-absolute protection for political speech are flawed
and obsolete. It is logical to strongly insulate political speech from
regulation when the greatest threats to a robust political speech
environment are information scarcity and government censorship. 302
Today, however, the primary dangers to a healthy and diverse political
discourse are attention scarcity and private manipulation of
information.303 This latter threat comes from individuals, corporations,
and information service providers that have captured outsized power to
distort and dominate the political speech ecosystem with their own
speech.

Accordingly, political speech itselfhas become a major censor of other
political speech and a serious threat to safe and informed political
discourse. Political speech today comprises intolerable levels of
harassment, propaganda, deceit, and bigotry, all of which risk very real
and harmful political consequences to our democracy and to individuals'
political participation and development. Political speech is responsible for
overwhelming, distorting, and manipulating the political sphere.3 04 Most

importantly, political speech risks harming the free and open exchange of
ideas as much as other types of speech, and is often the more powerful
and direct means of doing so. 305 Misinformed beliefs, prejudice, self302 Id. at 553-54.
303 Cf. Zeynep Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest
226 (2017) (discussing these phenomena at work in Egypt in 2011).
304 Wu, supra note 157, at 560 (identifying these harmful uses of political speech, including
through political harassment, propaganda, and flooding).
305 See Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris & Hal Roberts, Network Propaganda: Manipulation,
Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics 105-87 (2018) (documenting how

Fox News, other right-wing media sites, and Twitter personalities distort truth and politics

through their protected political speech); see also Wu, supra note 157, at 552-53 (discussing
the dangerous conditions created by "constitutional scrutiny of censorship coupled with a free

ride for propaganda"); Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, New
Yorker (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/01/how-russia[https://perma.cc/BNP5-A4VT] (discussing how
helped-to-swing-the-election-for-trump
Russian misinformation campaigns impacted the election); Andrew Marantz, Free Speech is
Killing Us, N.Y. Times (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/opinion/sunday/
free-speech-social-media-violence.html [https://perma.cc/NQD3-PPX9] (documenting the
violence caused by online hate and conspiracy speech and rejecting an "all-or-nothing"
approach to the First Amendment); James A. Piazza, Politician Hate Speech and Domestic
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interest, manipulation, social conditioning, bias, and propaganda are all
as prevalent and as dangerous in the realm of political speech as they are
in the social, cultural, and commercial spheres. 306 Where the harms
resulting from speech are equal, their regulation ought to be too.

Reconceptualizing free speech doctrine around a shared understanding
that the First Amendment bestows an equal and moderate level of
protection to all speech, including political speech, would not only align

theory and doctrine but would empower the public, through their
representatives, to better align public policy with public opinion on free

speech issues. This rethinking of the doctrine does not carry with it any
constitutional imperatives. It does not require greater restrictions on
political speech nor find a constitutional duty for regulating political
speech. It merely recognizes that the floor for regulating political speech
is lower than the canon suggests. It is for legislatures to consider what

regulations are needed based on democratic input, and it is for courts to
exercise appropriate deference in reviewing such regulations under the
First Amendment.

Robust protection for political speech is not inherently detrimental. The
myth of the hierarchy of speech protection has valuably fostered a strong
free speech norm, which has generated important speech-protective

outcomes in state houses and boardrooms across the country. That norm
need

not

change.

But

constitutionalizing

it

is

harmful.

And

constitutionalizing it in myth only, where it elides public scrutiny even as
the government routinely restricts political speech rights, is even worse.

The hierarchy myth does not reflect how speech functions, and thus
obscures the true value that different forms of speech have for advancing
communal and individual progress. It also does not reflect free speech
Terrorism, International Interactions, 46:3, at 431-53 (2020) (documenting how political hate
speech fuels domestic polarization and terrorism); Ernesto Verdeja & Bettina Spencer, The

Short Fuse: Autocrats, Hate Speech, and Political Violence, Just Security (July 22, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/71405/the-short-fuse-autocrats-hate-speech-and-political-violen

ce/ [https://perma.cc/T3GX-3L4V] (same).
306 See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 13, at 268 (discussing American Booksellers Ass'n v.

Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-32 (7th Cir. 1985), which accepted that pornography causes
serious harm to women but held that the First Amendment does not permit regulation of such
harm); Dan Barry, Mike McIntire & Matthew Rosenberg, 'Our President Wants Us Here':

The

Mob That

Stormed

the

Capitol, N.Y.

Times (updated

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html

Sept. 29,

2021),

[https://perma.cc/3PSE-9H88];

Amanda Robb, Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal, Rolling Stone (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.rollingstone.com/feature/anatomy-of-a-fake-news-scandal-125877/

[https://perma.cc/D3H4-PGJY].
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doctrine, and thus obfuscates the constitutionality of critical legal reforms
and shields free speech law from public scrutiny.
In place of the hierarchy myth, it is time to highlight the robust tradition
of moderate and equal speech protection in First Amendment
jurisprudence. This tradition represents the leading doctrinal organizing

principle of free speech law and undergirds a unifying theory of free
speech protection best characterized as the social democratic theory of
free speech.307 Moderate, equal speech protection is, and should be, the
keystone to the First Amendment. Section II.A will discuss why the
equalization principle is both beneficial and necessary to free speech
protection. Section II.B will discuss why moderate protection for all

speech is also normatively compelling.
A. The EqualizationPrinciple

Political and non-political speech are materially indistinguishable.
Political decisions have myriad social and economic implications, and
social and economic decisions have important political consequences.
The function and value of these different types of speech are
interchangeable and impossible to untangle. The already unmanageable
task of drawing distinctions between them is becoming more of a
Sisyphean effort in the information age. The digital economy has
completely blurred traditional distinctions between news, commentary,
art, protest, and advertisement, as well as skewed the boundaries between
private and public speech. The result is not only the melding of different
types of speech but also the merging of different spheres of human
capacity, leaving little room between our roles as sovereign citizen,

neighbor, and consumer. This leaves little constitutional reason for
drawing distinctions between types of speech and little pragmatic interest
for doing so as the harms each type of speech may inflict grow equivalent.
As the Supreme Court has often recognized, speech is crosscutting,

serving many individual, societal, and constitutional interests at the same

307 This article thus begins to push back on the dominant consensus that content-neutrality
is the central organizing principle of modern free speech law. As Part I documented, the
doctrine permits content discrimination when it is in function of preserving social-democratic
order, see supra Section ID, such as when states restrict speech to protect women's access to
healthcare clinics, student equality and inclusion in public schools, health privacy under laws
like HIPAA, the creation of art and literature through copyright, or municipal aesthetics and
public safety through zoning ordinances.
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time. 308 The speech at issue in New York Times v. Sullivan and Bigelow v.

Virginia is representative. In Sullivan, civil rights groups published an
advertisement protesting the treatment of Martin Luther King, Jr. and
appealing for funds to support their cause; 309 in Bigelow, a nonprofit

organization offered women in states that outlawed abortion access to
abortion at low cost in New York.31 0 Were these advertisements
commercially soliciting revenue, journalistically imparting information

of public import, or politically commenting on a divisive political
issue? 31 As the Court soon recognized in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the line between

"commercial" advertising and "public interest" advertising is
nonexistent. 3 12 Even where an ad does nothing more than promote a
product for sale, it is nonetheless disseminating commercial information
relevant to making commercial decisions, which in a free enterprise
system always carries some political and socioeconomic impact. 313 The

interchangeability of political and commercial speech in the
advertisement context is replicated throughout the speech ecosystem. In
Morse v. Frederick, for example, was the student's sign reading "BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS" advocating the legalization of marijuana, promoting a

religious belief, or presenting sensationalist fodder for passing television
cameras? 314 Even if the sign meant one thing to the speaker, could it not
convey myriad other messages to a viewer?
308 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552,579 (2011) ("The commercial marketplace,
like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information
flourish." (citation omitted)).
309 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-57 (1964). The Court rejected
characterizing the ad as "purely commercial advertising," because "[i]t communicated
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the

highest public interest and concern." Id. at 266.
310 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (extending First Amendment protection
to this ad because it contained "information of potential interest and value to a diverse
audience").

31" See also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (finding it
impossible to "draw[] bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct
category" separate from journalism and noting that the commercial handbills at issue "share
important characteristics with the publications that the city classifies as 'newspapers'").
3" Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)
("[N]o [such] line ... could ever be drawn.").
313

Id.

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) ("The message on Frederick's banner is
cryptic. It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it probably
3I
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Attempting to differentiate speech by type or purpose is especially

unrealistic in light of the intrinsic relationship between speech and
property. Individuals require things, places, and time to speak-all of
which

cost

money.

Speech

opportunities

thus

reflect

property

distributions. The content of speech expressed and the substance of public
discourse are dictated by political, social, and economic priors.3 1 This is
equally true for all speech-political, commercial, and cultural alike.
The rise of the digital economy has also exacerbated this blending of
different types of speech. The seismic shift from industrial output to
information production has infused speech into large swaths of the
economy, further undercutting any distinction between commercial and
non-commercial speech. 3 16 It has also erased traditional divisions between
news, commentary, art, entertainment, politics, and lived experience.
Social media and news media have intermingled, newsgathering relies on
popular remarks and observations, and journalists aggregate everyday

speech to spot trends and break stories. 317 Interactive media and virtual
reality blend commercialism with art, life, and entertainment. As Justice
Scalia quipped in discussing the difficulty of categorizing an interactive
video game, "it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and
dangerous to try." 3 18

The larger consequence of the expanding role and intersectionality of
speech in the digital age is that it melds the different spheres of human
capacity.

Alexander

Intellectuals

like John Locke, 3 19 Louis Brandeis,3 2 0 and

Meiklejohn3 2'

recognized an inherent difference between a

person acting in their capacity as a private citizen with private economic
interests and their acting as a public citizen with social and political
obligations. More recently, Robert Post and Amanda Shanor have

means nothing at all. Frederick himself claimed 'that the words were just nonsense meant to

attract television cameras."').
315 Seidman, supra note 52, at 2232, 2238.

316 Kessler & Pozen, supra note 11, at 1971-73 (discussing how the current era of

information capitalism has profound implications for the freedom of speech).
317 See Benkler, Faris & Roberts, supra note 305, at 225-33, 269-93 (discussing the role of
social media in spreading propaganda and "clickbait," including "microtargeting" of
advertisements); Tompros, Crudo, Pfeiffer & Boghossian, supra note 162, at 71 (documenting
how most social media speech, 85% in one 2010 study, is related to news events).
318 Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
319 2 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690).
320 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-75 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
321 Meiklejohn, supra note 212, at 79-83.
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similarly argued that when citizens engage in commercial speech, they
are not participating in democratic self-determination but only transacting
business in a marketplace. 322 But this can no longer be right, if it ever was.
When engaging in commercial speech, citizens are contributing in

deliberate ways to our political and social economy; and in transacting
business, citizens are making politically and socially consequential
choices. Our private lives influence our role as citizens, and our role as
citizens has immense consequence for our private affairs. 323 As Justice
Kennedy recognized in Citizens United, our private identities, which

include our wealth, are closely connected to our political identities, and
our private choices and resources are a part of our political personhood. 324
Acting in the role of "sovereign citizen," therefore, goes beyond
participating in public discourse to also engaging in the political economy

in a socially conscious manner.
Finally, beyond the indistinguishability of different types of speech,there is also little distinction between how vulnerable different types of
speech are to government suppression. First, political speech is no longer
uniquely vulnerable to government suppression, as it is now private
capital, private messaging, and private ownership of the mediums of

speech that most constrain and mold individuals' capacities to act as
sovereign

citizens

and

engage

in

self-determination

through

expression. 325 Second, the government no longer has greater incentive to
suppress political speech as compared to other speech. A hierarchy model

of speech protection would make sense in a world in which political
speech needed more protection because it was more vulnerable to attack.
In this world, a hierarchy model of speech protection would actually
function as a speech equalization tool by adjusting speech's level of
protection to account for its different category of risk. 32 6 But granting

heightened protection to political speech and reduced protection to
322 Post & Shanor, supra note 10, at 172.
323 See Heyman, supra note 13, at 263, 309.
324 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010).
321 See Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 292, at 2012, 2021; Fiss, supra note 270, at 1415
(arguing that the private sector is as dangerous an enemy to free speech as the government

because of its equal, if not greater, capacity to control the political marketplace of ideas);
Kagan, supra note 268, at 513.
326 This was then-Professor Elena Kagan's theory of First Amendment protection. Kagan,
supra note 268. She posited that the First Amendment was centrally concerned with preventing
illicitly motivated speech regulations, and that the matrix of First Amendment rules that

comprise the doctrine, including the hierarchy of speech principle, all work to ferret out illicit
governmental motive. Id. at 413-15.
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commercial speech based on the assumption that the government less
often acts for self-interested or ideological reasons when regulating in the
commercial sphere is untenable. Commercial regulations are laced with
moral and ideological value judgments, 327 and plenty of political speech
regulations are advanced independent of partisan ideology.

328

Where

politics is steeped in culture and inseparable from the economy, different
types of speech are equally vulnerable to government suppression for
ideological purposes.
In sum, considering that the distinctions between types of speech have
dissipated-in their practical function, individual and democratic value,
role in supporting private and public citizenship, and vulnerability to
government attack-there is little constitutional or prudential reason for
attempting to assign differential First Amendment treatment to different
types of speech.
B. The Moderation Principle

The hierarchy of speech protection fails not only for attempting to treat
speech unequally, but also for attempting to elevate protection for
political speech beyond democratic input. In purporting to immunize

political speech from legislative regulation, the hierarchy model
advocates a "Lochnerization" of political speech protection. 329 But
because no principled line can be drawn between political and nonpolitical speech, the hierarchy model actually risks Lochnerizing all of
free speech law. Discarding the hierarchy myth to embrace the First
Amendment's robust tradition of moderate speech protection for all

327 Think only of liquor laws, drug laws, or adult entertainment ordinances.

328 The statutes at issue in United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (Stolen Valor Act),
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (restricting sale of violent
video games to minors), and United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (criminalizing
certain depictions of animal cruelty) all fit this narrative, as they all restrict speech with clear
political undertones.
329 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). I use the Lochner moniker to refer to a
separation of powers scheme in which the judiciary exercises outsized prerogative to overturn
democratically enacted legislation on constitutional grounds. The term is often employed in
the more specific context of judicial usurpation of legislative authority in the commercial and
economic sphere only. Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, supra note 240, at 361-64;
Kessler & Pozen, supra note 11, at 1962-64. However, as this Article has argued, there is little
distinction between commercial and political speech, and thus the Lochner label is
appropriately used to describe the robust role the Court has claimed for itself in reviewing and
overturning all categories of speech regulations.
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speech-including for political speech-is therefore instrumental for
staving off the Lochnerization of the First Amendment.

For the First Amendment to remain anti-Lochnerian in the modern
speech era, the freedom of speech must parallel the anti-Lochnerian
freedom of contract. Namely, it must permit democratic regulation of
speech to account for power disparities in the speech ecosystem and to
protect the welfare and safety of participants in the political speech
economy. Like the modern contract right, the modern free speech right

should not treat all speakers and audiences as equals in the formation of
public discourse; it should instead acknowledge the real power
imbalances between them that create a tilted and dangerous speech
economy in the absence of regulation. Just as the right to contract was
never fully unregulated but had to adapt to accommodate egalitarian
constraints, so too the political speech right-also never immune from
regulation-must permit regulations justified by egalitarian interests. The

task at hand, therefore, is to reconceptualize free speech doctrine and the
role of the courts in protecting speech by reclaiming the strong, but

hidden, tradition of moderate protection for all speech. This tradition is
the central organizing principle of an unrecognized unifying theory of free
speech law best described as the "social democratic theory" of speech
protection.3 30
1. The Social Democratic (or Anti-Lochnerian) Theory of Speech
Protection
The social democratic theory of free speech protects speech as an

instrument of social democracy to safeguard the liberal-democratic state
as well as economic and cultural progress. A fully realized social
democratic theory of speech protection openly and unequivocally

embraces the moderate level of protection for all speech that dominates
much of the doctrine. It does so to safeguard the health, safety, and
general welfare of society. In other words, it aims to ensure that

330 The theory is "social" in that it focuses on the health of society and acknowledges that
social interactions are the building blocks of political, cultural, and economic power; it is

"democratic" in that the theory preserves room for majoritarian institutions to protect the

speech right. By treating all speech equally and subjecting speech to moderate democratic
control, the theory treats speech in an analogous way as the social democratic state treats
citizens: as equals whose rights are moderately subordinated to democratic constraints to
promote collective welfare.
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information flows "cleanly as well as freely," 33 1 and in this way, it is
fundamentally anti-Lochnerian.
Moderate protection permits government regulations on speech to

protect important social democratic interests, including the physical,
economic, and political welfare of the populace. In this way, moderate
protection is a substantively democratic version of "intermediate" or
"exacting" scrutiny. It does not permit government to regulate speech for
moral harms or harms to the government's own interests, such as sedition

harms.3 32 It also does not permit the restriction of expression based on the
government's approval or disapproval of a message, belief, or idea,
otherwise known as viewpoint discrimination. Nor does it treat any type

of information as inherently dangerous and thus does not leave any
category of speech fully unprotected. 333 Rather, it permits the government

to regulate the standards and mediums by which speech is expressed
where there is a substantial likelihood of social, political, or economic
injury that is material and provable, and not morally or ideologically
constructed, and where the regulation is narrowly tailored to addressing
this injury. 3 This type of scrutiny permits laws that foster a more
inclusive and egalitarian public discourse without compromising the
democratic legitimacy of governmental lawmaking because it does not
permit the total exclusion of any speech but rather allows for a wider
segment of the populace to meaningfully contribute to the definition and
scope of the free speech right.
Most importantly, the social democratic theory of speech protection
permits the government to regulate speech in recognition of the reality

that citizens are unequally situated and that most are interdependent,
331 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.-Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72
(1976).

332 Legislatures have less claim to restrict speech to protect against moral harms because

citizens have a greater degree of control over their own moral safety, whereas their physical,
economic, and political safety directly depend on the actions of others and thus require
communal protection. Preventing harms to the government itself is also an improper interest
because the government, unlike citizens, does not have natural rights to protect from public

harm. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 Yale L.J. 246, 309,
309 n.283 (2017).
"3 See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 ("There is, of course, an alternative to this highly
paternalistic approach [of restricting all pharmaceutical ads]. That alternative is to assume that
this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if

only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels
of communication, rather than to close them.").
34 See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, No. 19-251, slip op. at 3 (S. Ct. July 1, 2021)
(confirming a narrow tailoring requirement for "exacting" scrutiny).
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vulnerable, and insecure. Just as commercial speech doctrine explicitly
"allows governments to assume that consumers may not be able to assess
market information and market risks without compelled disclosures and
prohibitions on misleading advertisements,"" 5 the social democratic
theory of free speech permits the government to assume that citizens are

not able to assess political information and risks without regulations that
impose transparency, honesty, and accountability on speakers. This

standard of speech protection most evenly balances the rights of speakers
and audiences across the speech ecosystem. 336
These rules permit the government to address harms wrought by speech

while preserving courts' authority to overturn paternalistic and illicitly
motivated speech regulations. The social democratic theory of speech

protection thus focuses on ferreting out governmental abuse of the speech
regulation power, not with neutering the use of that power altogether.
After all, it is governmental abuse of power, not government power itself,

that threatens the freedom of speech and the preservation of our social
democracy.3 37
2. The Normative Benefits of a Social Democratic Theory of Speech
Protection

Embracing the social democratic theory of speech protection will best
refortify the freedom of speech at this precarious moment in its

development. At a similar moment of constitutional inflexion in the
1930s, the Court adapted its jurisprudence to a fundamental change in

economic production by abandoning Lochner and adopting a new
separation of powers dynamic that better served political and economic
prosperity. The same crossroads now lies before the freedom of speech.
As economic production moves towards information acquisition and

3 Balkin, Cultural Democracy, supra note 18, at 1086; cf. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 383 n.37 (1977) ("The determination whether an advertisement is misleading

requires consideration of the legal sophistication of its audience. Thus, different degrees of
regulation may be appropriate in different areas." (citation omitted)).
336 In this way, the social democratic theory differs from the democracy theory of free

speech, which prioritizes the public's role as an audience. See generally Meiklejohn, supra
note 212 (prioritizing the maintenance of an informed electorate to the continued existence of

self-governance).
33 A theory of speech protection based on ferreting out governmental abuse of power
compliments, but is somewhat broader than, Elena Kagan's theory that the First Amendment
is primarily concerned with ferreting out illicitly motivated speech restrictions. See Kagan,

supra note 268, at 413-15.

440

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 108:353

processing, the Court must reaffirm the anti-Lochnerian First Amendment
and invite the government to reshare in the role of protecting and
enhancing the freedom of speech. 338 This is not to suggest that the shift
be as dramatic for freedom of speech as it was for freedom of contract,
nor that such a shift requires as dramatic a change in the doctrine. To the
contrary, the doctrine roundly supports a social democratic, or antiLochnerian, speech right with its moderate level of speech protection. But
this tradition is in danger of being obscured and abandoned at the very
moment it must burst out from behind the shadow of the hierarchy myth
and resoundingly be embraced.
Such a move would have numerous beneficial consequences for free
speech, which the remainder of this Article will begin to unpack. It will,
firstly, better address the harms associated with the rise of "new speech";
secondly, better promote a healthy and democratic public discourse; and
thirdly, better prevent large swaths of our social, political, and economic
lives from running through the courts. These advantages will, in turn,
augment democratic legitimation, transparency, and accountability. In
sum, embracing the social democratic theory of First Amendment
jurisprudence will best serve political freedom in the twenty-first century.
First, a social democratic theory of free speech would better address
the problems raised by "new speech." New speech includes data,
analytics, and information sharing, and thus comprises an infinite amount
of social, political, and economic activity-everything from securities
transactions, to healthcare information, to voter analytics and political
disinformation. Under current doctrine, new speech stands to receive full
First Amendment protection. To the extent this level of protection remains
moderate-which this Article has shown would be unexceptional-then
the government will be fully equipped to regulate new speech to avoid
economic and political catastrophe.
338 See Kessler & Pozen, supra note 11, at 1971. Kessler and Pozen have begun to recognize
the need for this shift, id. at 1985-86, as has Tim Wu, supra note 157, at 568. Owen Fiss has
long recognized a more active role for the state in protecting free speech. See, e.g., Owen Fiss,
Why the State?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 783 (1987). And Cass Sunstein early on criticized
judges for invalidating legislative efforts to enhance popular sovereignty by fostering and
diversifying the spread of information. Cass Sunstein, Introduction to Democracy and the
Problem of Free Speech, at xi-xx (1995). Many other First Amendment scholars agree but
tend to confine the legislative role to the media sphere or campaign finance sphere. See, e.g.,
Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 427, 42833 (2009) (net neutrality); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1641 (1967) (mass media); Post, supra note 212, at 3-5
(campaign finance).

-
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The other major problem new speech poses, apart from its pervasive

breadth, is its sheer quantity. Today, the greatest threat to free speech is
that there is too much of it. Attention deficit ensures that an
overabundance of private speech crowds out, suppresses, and manipulates
the information ecosystem. 339 Modern censorship thus works by targeting
audiences, not speakers. 340 This flip in the dominant method of speech
censorship means that countering new speech censorship requires
information regulation, not information proliferation. 34 1 Affirmative

government intervention is most desirable precisely when private
incentives promote harmful behavior. 342 Speakers and content providers
have ample incentive to prioritize false, sensationalist, and siloed speech
to spread their message and gain support in the form of followers,

revenue, and traffic. Government interventions to reform incentive
structures in the speech ecosystem, therefore, would serve to counter the
censoring effects of information bias and overload to support audiences'
access to information. 343
Similarly, the "new speech" ecosystem is highly vulnerable to
distortion based on societal and economic inequalities because it
predominately occurs on private platforms and within private enterprises

governed by rules of property. Where public discourse is distorted based
on participants' inequality of resources and access, their speech is left
unprotected when it is shielded from regulation. Put simply, the First
Amendment cannot protect speech in the "new speech" environment by
requiring government to stand by while private entities censor,

manipulate, and control that environment.
Second, the social democratic theory of free speech does not undercut
individual speech rights; it reinforces them. As this Article has
339 See Tufekci, supra note 303, at xxiii-xxix.
340 Wu, supra note 157, at 548.
341 See Martha Minow, Saving the News: Why the Constitution Calls for Government
Action to Preserve Freedom of Speech 5-9 (2021) (discussing government's role in protecting
a healthy media and information-sharing environment through innovative media regulations).
342 Copyright offers an excellent model of this type of speech protection system. See
Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 36 (2000)

(explaining how copyright encourages a broad, diverse array of ideas and expressions by
protecting the marketplace and incentivizing particular types of expression, e.g., original and
generative expression, over other types, e.g., copies).
343 Other countries that have adopted more of a proportionality standard of speech protection

understand this principle well. See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 763 (Can.) ("[T]he
state should not be the sole arbiter of truth, but neither should we overplay the view that
rationality will overcome all falsehoods in the unregulated marketplace of ideas.").
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extensively laid out, a vast amount of political and non-political speech is
routinely and unremarkably regulated without unduly restricting the
speech right. The rationale for permitting regulation in these contexts is

that the speech at issue risks disrupting the underlying function and goals
of the environment in which the speech is expressed. By protecting the
speech environment, these regulations enhance speech opportunities. And

in rejecting the theory that the speech right trumps nearly all regulation,
these cases foster a stronger relationship between constitutional law and

democracy. This reasoning holds true for physical locations like parks,
schools, and the polls just as it does for metaphysical spheres like the
criminal justice system and the commercial economy. The same rationale
ought easily to apply to the workings and goals of a functioning
democracy-that metaphysical space in which citizens are equipped to

engage in fair, honest, and healthy public discourse.
Permitting government leeway to set the rules of engagement in

democracy sounds anathema but is, in truth, a big part of our free speech
tradition that should be respected and replicated. For example, under the
First Amendment's time, place, and manner doctrine, the government
regularly determines that certain speech is only appropriate for certain

times and in certain places, and restricts speech expressed outside these
bounds without totally closing off the opportunity for expression.
Sometimes the restriction concerns the appropriateness of the content of
the message, and sometimes it concerns the manner in which it is
expressed. 344 Either way, this time-tested approach to ensuring an orderly,

safe, and healthy public discourse in the physical public sphere might
easily be imported to the virtual and metaphysical spaces in which more
and more public discourse now occurs.
Third, there are significant advantages to supporting legislative
attention to speech protection and discouraging judicial hegemony in this

area. It is widely accepted that courts ought not to exercise a robust role
in reviewing commercial legislation, including commercial speech
legislation, because doing so would open up large swaths of the
administrative state and the economy to judicial scrutiny, running our

social and economic lives through the courts. 34 5 The mythologized First
344 For example, the government regularly restricts speech in educational settings, museums,
or public programming when the content is incompatible with that forum, as well as regularly
restricts speech that is too loud, disorderly, or disruptive for certain times and places like

residential neighborhoods. See supra notes 144, 149 and accompanying text.
345 See Shanor, supra note 240, at 359.
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Amendment would permit exactly this with respect to our public
discourse; it would run political and cultural speech through the courts,
leaving the terms by which citizens engage with one another and with
their government in the unreviewable hands of the judiciary. In the

absence of a more robust dialogue between legislative experimentation
and judicial review, the laws governing citizens' social and political

welfare will suffer from a lack of democratic legitimation, accountability,
and creativity. They will also fail to adequately address the prevalent
harms speech has on third parties, 346 as judges are disinclined to
acknowledge and account for harms to non-litigants.

The policy implications of this move are significant. Reaffirming the
social democratic theory should encourage reforms to the speech
ecosystem that policy experts are currently tiptoeing around for fear they
run afoul of the mythologized protection for political speech. 347 Such
reforms include obligating platforms to remove, reduce, and counter
misinformation;348 capping speech to prevent any speaker from
dominating the speech market; 34 9 requiring disclosure of speaker
identities in specific contexts;35 0 or imposing common carrier or public

utility responsibilities on platforms. 35 1 It is beyond the scope of this
Article to evaluate the merits of any one of these reforms. Rather, the
central contribution here is confirming the constitutionality of such policy
346

See Kessler & Pozen, supra note 11, at 1999.

341 See, e.g., Daphne Keller, Six Constitutional Hurdles for Platform Speech Regulation,
The Ctr. for Internet and Soc'y (Jan. 22, 2021), cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2021/01/six[https://perma.cc/YV79-VGS9] (listing
constitutional-hurdles-platform-speech-regulation
robust First Amendment parameters for regulating platforms); Susan Ness, Platform
Regulation Should Focus on Transparency, Not Content, Slate (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/ 12/platform-regulation-european-commission-transparenc

y.html [https://perma.cc/LU93-B2KN] (assuming content-moderation reforms are likely to
infringe the First Amendment); Noah Feldman, Constitution Can't Stop Trump From

Blocking Tweets, Bloomberg (June 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2017-06-07/constitution-can-t-stop-trump-from-blocking-tweets [https://perma.cc/F6HL-EX
JT] (arguing that imposing content-moderation obligations on social media platforms violates
the First Amendment).

34s This type of obligation is analogous to indirect compelled speech through the imposition
of fees; to time, place, and manner restrictions on speech that disallow amplification of speech
in public forums; and to defamation and false reporting statutes. See supra Section I.B.
349 Such a reform mirrors the application of antitrustlaw to the press and to communications

entities. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945).
350 As discussed supra Subsection i.B.1, compelled disclosure of political speech furthers
the First Amendment's interest in preserving a free and informed political discourse.
351 These reforms would model the regulatory frameworks applicable to electronic media
providers, as discussed supra Subsection I.B.2.
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proposals under the dominant First Amendment tradition of equal speech
protection. Uncovering this tradition reaffirms that government may
regulate speech in myriad ways based on its institutional context, its
manner, its proximity to the voting process, and if it creates tangible
harms to democratic discourse. These regulation frameworks are
sufficiently protective of the speech right and leave open ample
opportunity for expression, while permitting the government to foster the
free and healthy dissemination of political information.
Several recent cases challenging regulations that impact speech to

foster a healthy and informed political discourse show how the social
democratic theory works in practice. The Supreme Court case Americans
for Prosperity v. Bonta, which struck down a California law requiring
nonprofit organizations to submit a list of their major donors to the state,
was correctly decided under the social democratic theory of speech
protection. 352 Such disclosure laws are generally perfectly constitutional
under this theory; but in this case, California required the information
without intention of making it public or of using it to enforce its tax code.

The regulation was not, therefore, narrowly tailored to the interest of
fostering democratic discourse or of supporting a necessary government

function in a social democracy. Put simply, the regulation failed moderate
review. Conversely, a pending First Amendment challenge to a state

board's authority to censure one of its members for their political speech
ought to fail because state board members are institutional speakers and
the censure tool serves the interest of maintaining a well-functioning
government administration without unduly restricting the individual
speech right. In the same vein, novel regulations prohibiting reporting on

agricultural facilities, colloquially known as ag-gag laws, generally
violate the First Amendment because they do not prevent tangible harms
to democratic discourse (in effect, they do the opposite), and the economic
harm they pose to the agricultural businesses is not a sufficient interest
under the social democratic theory to restrict speech and newsgathering.
Finally, a recent case striking down a state election law requiring social
media platforms, broadly defined, to disclose certain information about
the political ads on their websites was wrongly decided, as such a law
directly relates to promoting a more healthy and informed political
discourse in connection to an election. 353

No. 19-251, slip op. at 1-2 (S. Ct. July 1, 2021).
13 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 510 (4th Cir. 2019).
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Finally, the major structural implication of reaffirming the social
democratic theory of speech protection is to rethink the grand New Deal

compromise that bifurcated the protection of economic and political
rights between the legislative and judicial branches. The protection of the
freedom of speech ought to be a collaborative endeavor, made possible
by a First Amendment that provides an equal and moderate level of
protection to all speech. Few scholars have attacked the New Deal
compromise directly, presumably out of a reluctance to lower judicial
protection for political speech. 3s4 But a comprehensive review of the
doctrine reveals that political speech already receives moderate First
Amendment protection. And the few places where it receives higher

protection are its true problem areas, not the other way around. Moreover,
there is little historical or theoretical basis for thinking that the judiciary
is more effective at protecting the speech right than legislatures. Politics,
as opposed to litigation, is the optimal place to mediate conflicts of rights,

which is a task that requires compromise, value judgments, and public
input. Legislatures have proven time and again their sensitivity to
proactively protecting free speech and other civil liberties by passing

strong and dynamic protections for democratic discourse, including by
subsidizing speech, redistributing speech rights, and protecting speech

from economic or political reprisal. Conversely, the Supreme Court's
track record exercising judicial review of such laws consists of more false

positives, whereby the Court overturns a pro-democracy law, than true
positives, wherein the Court blocks an anti-democratic abuse of the
speech regulation power. Confining the courts to scrutinizing speech-

restrictive laws for abuses of power-i.e., for regulations not narrowly
tailored to safeguarding a governmental function or the democratic
process-ensures a stopgap measure of protection for speech without
neutering the government's ability to promote democracy and social
welfare. Where legislatures err by restricting too much speech or the
wrong type of speech, that is more often a matter of policy disagreement

than constitutional infirmity, and public discontent should be registered
with our representatives rather than with a court that is unlikely to alter
the law from the bench anyways.

.. Kessler & Pozen, supra note 11, at 2009 (acknowledging that progressive civil
libertarianism of the pre-New Deal model "does not claim at this time any significant
constituency within the legal academy"); cf. Seidman, supra note 52, at 2237 (arguing for a

reexamination of the New Deal compromise because speech depends on property, and
therefore, free speech cannot neatly be separated from economic liberty).
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The inevitable conclusion of these observations is that moderate
protection for speech across the board best accomplishes the reformist
agenda of enhancing a healthy public discourse; and moderate protection
for all speech, including and especially political speech, requires not only
abandoning the myth of the hierarchy of speech protection, but also
abandoning the New Deal compromise.
CONCLUSION

The hierarchy of speech protection is a doctrinal myth that masks a rich
tradition of moderate and equal speech protection. As the freedom of
speech reaches a critical juncture in its constitutional development, it is

imperative to uncover this hidden tradition and translate its potential to
the modern speech environment. This Article has taken a significant step

in that direction by holistically reevaluating the Supreme Court's speech
protection jurisprudence, and in so doing, reconceptualizing free speech

law's contours, limits, and possibilities. The next step for scholars and
policy experts is to discern the legislative potential of embracing the
hidden social democratic theory of speech protection. What laws can and
should pass under this free speech tradition that are most likely to tame
our dangerously toxic political speech environment and foster a healthy,
diverse, and truthful political discourse? Because putting all its rhetoric
and mythology aside, the First Amendment is not actually committed to
protecting "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate."' It is
committed to safeguarding a healthy, orderly, and informative public
sphere. It does so, and should continue to do so, through the tradition of
equal speech protection.

3

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

